How the US President is Building His Legacy

According to the liberal media and social media platforms, he has simply gone mad. But even conservative commentators are asking: Does he know what he’s doing? His popularity ratings are low, with 70% of Americans opposing his actions regarding Greenland, and the GOP must prepare to lose control of the House of Representatives. However, there is another explanation: in his second and final term, Trump is thinking more about how he will be remembered by history and less about poll results.

Author: Maciej Kożuszek

“This is my last election. After this, I’ll have more flexibility,” Barack Obama told Dmitry Medvedev on March 26, 2012, assuming the microphones were off. In Poland, this statement is primarily remembered as a symbol of Obama’s “reset” with Russia. However, Obama also expressed an important truth about the American system concerning presidents who are elected for two terms. During the first term, thoughts turn to the second; during the second, thoughts turn to one’s presidential legacy and how to implement one’s political plan as efficiently as possible. Obama’s example shows that “greater flexibility” can have disastrous consequences: the implementation of his plan led to the creation of ISIS in the Middle East and the start of the war in Ukraine. However, Obama’s Nobel Peace Prize remained intact because it had been awarded well in advance…

Apart from Trump’s irrationality, a second diagnosis dominates among commentators: he is not as strong as previously thought. They predict that he will face an internal crisis, lose the midterm elections, see his ratings fall, and be further weakened by competition within his own party for the 2028 presidential nomination. This is a classic example of drawing false conclusions based on true premises. If the midterm elections were held today, it seems certain that the Democrats would take control of the House of Representatives. In the so-called generic ballot — polls measuring voter preferences without dividing them into congressional districts — Democrats enjoy a lead of about 5 percentage points.

In midterm elections, when Americans do not elect a president, voter mobilization is important because turnout is usually lower. Democrats have even more reason to be optimistic here, as they enjoy a 16-point lead among voters who say they are “certain to vote.” The fact that the overall level of trust in Democrats in Congress (28%) is lower than that in Republicans (35%) may be problematic, but only in 2028 when the deeply crisis-stricken party will have to decide whether to follow Zohran Mamdani’s radical leftist path. In House elections, Americans vote in districts. Progressive candidates are put forward in more progressive areas, while more centrist candidates are put forward in the center of America.

But why is the conclusion that Trump is weak false? He himself says that if the Democrats take control of the House, they will attempt to impeach him again. This is true insofar as Trump, like any politician, would prefer to have absolute power. However, sharing power with Congress has its advantages. First, the spectacle of impeachment—which obviously won’t lead to Trump’s removal from the White House—can be a great tool for mobilizing and uniting his supporters. Second, responsibility can be shared by using one of the oldest tricks in American politics.  “I have a great plan, but Congress (or the president, in the Polish context) is making it difficult for me.” Thanks to this trick, Biden shifted all responsibility for delays in supporting Ukraine to Congress, even though the White House was actually responsible for many of them. Even obedient liberals, led by Donald Tusk, criticized the Republicans in the House, not the president. Third, Congress’s tools for stopping the president’s plans are limited, especially in his second term. “I have a pen, and I have a phone,” Barack Obama said in 2014 during his second term when Congress was not cooperating with him. “So, I can sign executive orders, and I can use the weight and importance of my office to convince people of my plans.”

The American system is designed so that the president is elected every four years. During his term, he is granted significant power, making it difficult to remove him from office. This is why midterm elections and polls are important, though they should not be fetishized. Harry Truman, the architect of the postwar system whom everyone is mourning now, holds the record for the lowest approval rating in modern U.S. history. In February 1952, only 22 percent of Americans approved of Truman’s performance. During Ronald Reagan’s eight years as president, Republicans never controlled the House of Representatives. In his last two years, 1987–1989, they also lost control of the Senate. However, history has forgotten these turbulent times in the case of both presidents, focusing instead on the legacy they left behind.

So, the real question is: What legacy does Trump want to leave behind? As a second-term president with a particular character, he has a much greater tolerance for domestic and international turbulence. This must be considered when answering the question: Are the steps taken by the Trump administration rational? The measure here is not the scale of the turmoil and endless episodes of liberal hysteria but whether Trump’s actions serve to implement his plan. Anyone who knows a little history knows that no one has complete control over it and that every plan crumbles when it comes into contact with reality. Moreover, the challenges Trump faces, as well as those facing the US and the West as a whole, are so great that the means used to achieve one goal may prove to be an obstacle to achieving others. For example, Trump would like Europe to clearly stand with the US against China and Russia. However, achieving this goal requires “maximum pressure” to be exerted on Europe. However, Europe, as we clearly saw in Davos, is reluctant to do so.

The paradox of our times is that many people essentially agree with some of Trump’s views. Does Europe have a problem with migration and other issues? Of course. Does Europe need to stop “free riding” when it comes to security? Absolutely! Is it necessary to reduce dependence on rare earth metals in the face of confrontation with China? Yes. Would greater U.S. involvement in Greenland, in terms of both security and economics, increase NATO’s security? Regardless of emotional attitudes, the answer is yes.

The problem is not the diagnoses; the problem is Trump. Europe agrees but would prefer a better atmosphere. However, Trump might respond by drawing on the experience of the Cold War and, above all, the Biden administration. When the atmosphere was good, Europe was satisfied and issued statements about its readiness to meet the challenges of the era. Still, it did nothing.

There is Hope for a European Renewal

The ultimate goal is the spiritual renewal of Europe, as expressed by Vice President Vance in the NSS in Munich and by President Trump in Davos. However, there is a problem with reconciling goals because the pressure Trump puts on Europe puts his potential allies in a difficult position in this renewal effort. This is why several right-wing parties and leaders in the West have distanced themselves from Trump in response to the Greenland crisis. A more realistic operational plan is to break European unity. Contrary to declarations about how united and assertive Europe was on the issue of Greenland, this is already happening. This is illustrated by leaked text messages from Macron proposing a bilateral meeting in Paris while the European Council was establishing a united anti-Trump front. Europe resembles gang members who emphasize “no cooperation” during their get-togethers while selling each other out, figuring on receiving lighter sentences.

Polish politicians, especially those on the right, must participate in this process in a way that considers Poland’s interests. President Nawrocki’s approach to Trump’s Peace Council proposal exemplifies this dilemma. So far, the most advantageous option has been chosen. In view of these choices, two principles must be kept in mind. First, it is the role of Polish politicians, not Trump, to look after our Polish interests. Second, we should take advantage of parts of his plan that align with ours. Breaking up European unity is one of them. If you know your history, you know that the road to greater “European” autonomy, as the view from Paris and Brussels, has always led through Moscow—and today, through Moscow and Beijing.

For the original in Polish, please access: https://niezalezna.pl/swiat/trumpa-randka-z-historia-jak-prezydent-usa-buduje-swoje-dziedzictwo/562686

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If we don’t tell our own story, someone else will

Jan ŚLIWA

Is passionate about languages and culture. An IT specialist, he wites about data protection, medical research, ethics, and the social aspects of technology. Lives and works in Switzerland.

In popular discourse, Poland’s history during and immediately after World War II is reduced to two concepts: Jedwabne and Kielce. “We are dealing with a dirty propaganda war,” writes Jan Śliwa.

“Poland has no luck with historians.” For most, it is a marginal topic treated only in relation to their neighbors, who, as the main protagonists, enjoy the authors’ sympathy. Authors often repeat common opinions or are biased, especially since Poland represents values that aren’t necessarily valued in the modern world. Polish historians, on the other hand, do not publish much in world languages, and when they do, their works are not very visible.

Solid academic works are important, but perhaps more important are popular books available in every bookstore because they shape public opinion. In the current situation, public opinion is of strategic importance, and it is also more pleasant when people understand and like us.

Poland as seen by Western historians

While looking for new releases, I came across an interesting discussion with historian Eric Kurlander. I learned that he had just published a history of Germany with co-authors Douglas T. McGetchin and Bernd-Stefan Grewe. Modern Germany: A Global History. It is a true magnum opus at 907 pages. It’s a good opportunity to look at the matter from a broader perspective. As usual, I looked for information about the author to better understand his views and prejudices, as well as his connection to Poland. I had some doubts about a few points. Of course, this is the history of Germany, not Poland or Europe. Therefore, the author has the right to his own selection of topics and perspective. A history of Prussia written by a Polish author will not be identical to one written by a German author.

To what extent can I expect comprehensive coverage of Polish issues? There is much more information about France, but the relationship between Germany and France was much more intense. Our view is different. For us, Germany (like Russia) has been our nemesis for a thousand years. For them, however, Poland is a peripheral country. Upon closer reading, I saw that many issues, including potentially problematic ones, were reasonably addressed. Examples include Bismarck, Germanization, and the Kulturkampf. Then there’s the Intelligenzaktion, the activities of the Einsatzgruppen, deportations from Greater Poland, the Generalplan Ost, and slave labor. Hans Frank stated that after the war, he wanted to turn Poles, Ukrainians, and others into mincemeat. Then there is the role of Pope John Paul II and Solidarity in the transformations in Poland and Europe, as well as in the reunification of Germany.

All of these topics are fine. But there are some discrepancies. Is the issue of the partitions important? For us, it is an existential matter that has followed us to this day.

For them, much less so. It began with Prussia, which was economically and demographically exhausted after the Seven Years’ War (1756–1763). The acquisition of additional territories as a result of the First Partition of Poland helped Prussia grow in power and influence. The subsequent partitions are mentioned but not given much attention. Just another neighboring country that disappeared. It happens.

The Holocaust plays a primary role in the description of World War II. It is good to have helpers for the Holocaust. Frank’s statement about minced meat is supplemented by the remark that the “divide and conquer” policy was possible thanks to Poles’ deeply rooted anti-Semitism based on religious hatred. After listing the Western volunteers of the Waffen SS, the authors write on page 622 that “even non-Jewish Poles, who were the main victims of the Nazis after the Jews, often had the task of managing camps and operating gas chambers and crematoria as kapos.” Next, there is Jedwabne, where Poles and Ukrainians waited for Jews to be murdered or deported so they could take over their property and homes. Then, there are reflections on why “so many Jews, Poles, and other victims went to their deaths almost voluntarily, without resistance.”

As for resistance, there are mentions of escapes from camps into the forest and the famous Bielski brothers’ unit. I don’t see any “non-Jewish Poles” here. Half a page is devoted to the Warsaw Jewish Ghetto uprising of 1943, with a note to not confuse it with the Warsaw Uprising of 1944. Apart from these eleven words (including articles and prepositions), there is no further mention of this event. The Home Army? What army?

There is plenty of evidence on page 628 that “Polish nationalists and anti-Semites, themselves victims of Nazi occupation, nevertheless risked their lives to save Jews.” The source is Nechama Tec, author of the highly recommended book When Light Pierced the Darkness. Christian Rescue of Jews in Nazi-Occupied Poland.

So there is obligatory nationalism and anti-Semitism, all under the guise of surprise that they helped. I know this is about the Żegota organization, but that’s just my opinion. After reading about the good Poles, we read about the few good Ukrainians and Germans.

In contrast, we read a lengthy paragraph about the heroic Danes who transported several thousand Jews a few kilometers across the strait to neutral Sweden. While this is commendable, it has nothing to do with the problem of millions of unassimilated Jews in the middle of the continent. Poland does not have its own Sweden. The minor fact that Nordic Aryans had more freedom than Slavic subhumans is omitted. The second paragraph discusses Bulgaria, which, despite its alliance with Germany, did not succumb to pressure to deport Jews. This is an incomparable case as well, since Bulgaria was not occupied. The subchapter listing the victims includes Jews, followed by homosexuals, Roma, and Sinti. The photographs depict the shooting of Poles in Bochnia, the defense of Warsaw in 1939, forced laborers (mostly Poles) at the Agfa factory, and Poles hanged by Germans near Radom. We can also learn about German forms of resistance, such as the White Rose, the Edelweiss Pirates, and the Stauffenberg conspiracy.

Now, let’s move on to recent times. Germany’s intensified cooperation with Russia (including Nord Stream), combined with its growing role in Europe, has led to closer ties between Europe and Russia — and therefore with Putin. Ties with Putin are nothing to be proud of. At least for now—later, we’ll see.

The authors remain proud of Angela Merkel’s decision to open Germany’s borders to migrants in 2015. They accuse countries that did not participate in the relocation effort, Poland in particular, of xenophobia. They argue that Poland’s problems are Germany’s problems because Germany bears the burden of maintaining democracy in Europe and around the world. A similar concept from a century earlier was the “white man’s burden” — the difficult but honorable duty of civilizing savage peoples. Bulmer and Paterson describe Germany as a “reluctant hegemon,” while Minister Radek Sikorski calls it an “indispensable nation.” During Donald Trump’s presidency, Germany had to take the United States under its wing and became the leader of the free world in its own imagination. In Europe, Germany had to become a bulwark against right-wing populism. The overuse of the term “right-wing populism” suggests that the author is taking the easy way out by replacing analysis of facts with adjectives and labels. One of the most dangerous right-wing populist governments is Poland’s Law and Justice (PiS) party, because they are in power. Angela Merkel bravely stood up to them, admonishing them on principle during her visit to Auschwitz in December 2019. She spoke about the rule of law, growing racism, hate crimes, attacks on the fundamental values of liberal democracy, and dangerous historical revisionism. These are standard comments about Poland, which is not surprising. However, in this case, it was akin to criticizing Israel’s policy toward Palestinians during a visit to Yad Vashem.

The book builds up to Russia’s aggression against Ukraine. We learn that Germany is leading the way in supplying Ukraine with weapons. Germany may continue to advance toward global leadership in the future. Its dark past could motivate it to care about the environment, democracy, and human rights. Germany should embody these values at home and promote them in Europe and around the world. However, I’m not sure if this is a hopeful outlook or a warning.

Common, everyday opinions

In popular discourse, Poland’s history during and immediately after World War II is reduced to two concepts: Jedwabne and Kielce. The fact that the Jedwabne massacre was only one element of the Wehrmacht’s crimes is overlooked. The nearly two-year Soviet occupation preceding the Jedwabne massacre is also overlooked — as are the deportations, collaboration, and enrichment that occurred during this period. Similarly, the Soviet consummation of the Yalta and Potsdam agreements — the subjugation of Poland, which had been ongoing since 1944 — is not a topic of interest. In this sea of blood, only Kielce matters. What about the police bullets? They were Polish police, after all. The general expropriation of society by communists is the taking of Jewish property by Poles once again. The 1968 dispute between Communist party factions in Poland is another manifestation of Polish anti-Semitism, and Gomułka becomes a Polish nationalist. Beating and expelling students who demand freedom does not count. Similarly, the periodic shooting of workers does not count. The suppression of the Prague Spring in August 1968 was probably also an act of Polish aggression, although we said: All of Poland is waiting for its Dubček!

In stories about World War II, it is frustrating to see the constant distinction between Jews and Poles, with the subliminal (or overt) message that only Jewish lives matter. The desire to preserve one’s own life is considered selfish, while the lives of one’s spouse and children are considered unimportant. Prof. Jan Grabowski from the University of Ottawa specializes in this, traveling the world with stories of how well Poles lived under occupation and how they eagerly awaited the opportunity to seize Jewish property and collaborate with the Germans in killing Jews. He also criticizes Poland’s proposal to expand the program of school trips to Poland. While the inclusion of the Cursed Soldiers [Żołnierze Wyklęci] is problematic, his opinion that the Ulma Museum in Markowa should be “avoided at all costs” is scandalous.

Recently, he has taken up the fight against Wikipedia articles that he believes are too flattering to Poles. He claims these articles whitewash Poles, downplay their complicity in the Holocaust, exaggerate the scale of their aid to Jews, emphasize their own suffering by linking it to the Holocaust, and unnecessarily remind readers of Jewish collaboration with the Nazis and participation in Stalinist crimes. However, when it comes to correcting Wikipedia, I recently noticed that the process is going in the opposite direction. For example, the English version lists Chaim Rumkowski, president of the Łódź Judenrat, as Polish. One must be careful when correcting facts, as it has logical consequences. If Rumkowski was Polish, then all the inhabitants of the Łódź Ghetto and the victims of Auschwitz were Polish too. We probably don’t want to draw such conclusions. However, logic is not the basic criterion here. We are dealing with a propaganda war.

What should we write?

If we want our history to be understood from many perspectives and not just from the point of view of unfriendly foreign authors, we must write texts with foreign readers in mind—readers who are not yet familiar with our cultural codes. First, the reader must find the book. Second, they must pick it up. Third, they must know enough about why they are reading it to finish it—or almost finish it.

It’s not entirely true that no one will write our history for us. There are enthusiasts who have found a little-known source of fascinating stories in Polish history. One such enthusiast is Roger Moorhouse, author of The Devil’s Pact: Hitler and Stalin’s Alliance, a book about the Ribbentrop-Molotov Pact, and Poland 1939: The First Against Hitler, a book about the September 1939 Campaign. His book The Forgers, which is about the activities of Ładoś’s group in Bern, will be published soon.

However, these are just exceptions. There are many other topics worth presenting, such as the magnificent Golden Age, the partitions, and the struggle to regain independence, preserve identity, and build a modern nation. It was a persistent struggle that was ultimately successful.

In books on German and European history, I usually unsuccessfully look for information on the Polish-Bolshevik War of 1920. We are convinced that we saved Europe from a Bolshevik invasion, yet no one west of the Oder River notices. Alternatively, the war is viewed as an example of Poland’s expansionist policies or as an opportunity for Germany to regain lost territories. As early as the 1920s, they were saved from gulags stretching from Lisbon to Vladivostok, yet no one there is aware of this. Presenting communism — not only its brutal form, with torture and shots to the back of the head, but also its everyday reality, where successive generations try to wait it out while living in internal exile — is a huge task. This explains why we do not miss communism and have no fondness for concepts such as progress, atheism, and the left. At least that is the case in my generation. Young people have already lost this resistance.

The barrier of mentality

For a potential reader to pick up the book, they must have a reasonably positive attitude toward the subject. As I wrote above, accusing Poland of everything is a pleasant and lucrative occupation for many. Anti-Polish sentiment is the last socially tolerated prejudice against a nation. New topics are added to the old ones, such as autocracy, violations of democracy and the rule of law, Catholic right-wing nationalism, and homophobia. Here, too, the authors value repeating mantras and expressing emotions more than conducting an in-depth analysis. After all, Poland is a special case with a centuries-long struggle for survival based on traditional values: God, Honor, Homeland, family, and the protection of life. These concepts provoke an allergic reaction in Old Europe. Added to this is an occupation unique in its brutality, unlike those experienced by France or Denmark. On top of that, there is the struggle against communism, which the West fortunately never encountered closely nor developed immunity to. The discussion about March 1968 is illustrative. To Westerners, the Polish United Workers’ Party [PZPR] is the Polish government; the Citizens’ Militia [MO] and the Motorized Reserves of the Citizens’ Militia [ZOMO] are the Polish police; and workers holding posters provided by the party organization express Polish public opinion, which is traditionally anti-Semitic and shaped by the Church. They cannot imagine that we worked for $30 a month and stood in long lines for butter. After emigrating, a year of work in the West easily restored our pre-departure financial status. Few people notice that the 1968 emigrants only then realized the inconveniences of communism, while the rest of society had painfully learned about them more than 20 years earlier. This illustrates how isolated they were, much like whites in South Africa with their “whites only” stores and other privileges.

This tradition defines the Polish mentality. It is not us who should cure ourselves of it; rather, it is others who should try to understand it. One might think that the era of uprisings is a closed chapter in history. Yet, today, I am reading about the Wagner Group’s preparations (for what kind of move?) in Belarus. History is unfolding before our eyes, but it is not felt within the continent. Poland’s task is to guard the limes and defend civilization from invasion.

If Western audiences have many prejudices against us, it would be good to break them down. But how? Perhaps by accomplishing something great? Winning the soccer championship or flying to the moon are out of the question for now. Whenever there’s a major forest fire in Greece, Polish firefighters go there. TVP shows it, and the locals see it — and that’s it. Actually, we recently did something great: we provided immediate aid to Ukraine without any cynical bargaining. But before that, we had — and still have — an influx of migrants from Lukashenko’s Belarus, against whose threat Poland has built a wall. For many, accepting masses of (white) refugees from Ukraine only proved our racism. It’s hard to please everyone.

Agreement — crisis and catharsis?

Reaching an agreement with the countries of the old EU is difficult. Their colonial tradition probably plays a role here. They are gradually becoming accustomed to cutting funds for the most trivial reasons. They treat the Polish legal system like a self-service store and the constitution of the “European Iroquois” as if it were worthless. In theory, we should discuss how to solve Europe’s problems and decide on a direction to move forward. However, discussing these issues with Brussels officials as equals is as unlikely as Montezuma advising the Spanish king. They may admit, “You were right for 20 years, but now keep quiet.”

A multilateral crisis in the West could bring about a change in thinking. Ideologically, it has long been in the making. Comparisons with China’s Great Leap Forward come to mind. However, a great famine quickly ensued in China, whereas it will take longer in Europe due to its greater reserves. I don’t know how many Members of the European Parliament (MEPs) can calculate whether the energy system will be able to cope with the shutdown of nuclear power plants and the simultaneous transition to electric vehicles. Those planning to bring European agriculture back to the state it was in during the time of Charlemagne are not naturalists. Immigration has long exceeded safe levels and continues to do so. The magnificent recovery fund will probably end in failure and widespread quarreling. I don’t wish anyone harm, but some people need a wake-up call to change their views. If Poland holds out and does not lose what remains of its common sense, it could transform from a scapegoat into a model for others. However, the road to this goal is long and bumpy. Remember that China has transformed itself from a manufacturer of poorly made underwear into a strategic opponent of America in our lifetime. This required enormous work and persevearance.

Poland has a wonderful history—not only in terms of heroism, but also reason and civic spirit. It has produced remarkable and original art, particularly in painting. During the Second Polish Republic, Poland was a powerhouse in mathematics and philosophy. Now, some say it is the scourge of the European Union, while others say it is a bastion of common sense. This gives us the potential to find people interested in learning what kind of country Poland actually is, how it differs from other countries, and why. At this point, however, you need materials to present. So, work—painstaking work at the grassroots level. Look for allies and new channels for spreading information. Not everyone wants to hear constant scare stories about right-wing populists, especially since the AfD is already in second place in Germany itself and no one knows where it’ll be next year.

It’s important for Europeans to realize that Putin doesn’t have to embody conservatism. One does not have to support either pornographic shows for children or the bombing of Mariupol. There is a normal country that is currently as isolated as Asterix’s Gaulish village. But it has good prospects.

We should note the project “We Tell the World About Poland,” run by journalists from the editorial office of “Wszystko co Najważniejsze” [Everything That Matters]. Its authors are Polish historians, intellectuals, and opinion leaders, including Professors Andrzej Nowak, Wojciech Roszkowski, Marek Kornat, Piotr Gliński, Karol Nawrocki, Mateusz Morawiecki, and Jan Rokita, among others. Their texts are reaching renowned media outlets in over 60 countries, including Le Figaro, the Washington Post, the Chicago Tribune, the Sunday Express, Il Messaggero, La Repubblica, El Mundo, L’Opinion, and Der Standard. The problem is that for decades, the Polish voice has not been heard. History has been written by others, and in cases of doubt, Poles have been assigned the role of villains. Therefore, as soon as the Polish voice appears, Poles seem to be “rewriting history.” This challenges the established image, which is why it arouses resistance.

Sometimes it seems that all this is beyond our strength. But let us take an example from the great ones who came before us and showed great persistence. Professor Tatarkiewicz, fleeing the burning city of Warsaw after the 1944 uprising, was stopped by a German officer. “What are you carrying there?” “My academic work.” The German officer threw the manuscript into the gutter, saying, “There is no more Polish culture.” Tatarkiewicz dared to pull the manuscript, On Happiness, out of the gutter. Yes, we can do more than we think.

Jan Śliwa

Material protected by copyright. Further distribution only with the publisher’s consent. July 22, 2023

Photo: Maciej Figurski / Forum

History of Poland

The Polish language oryginal can be found here: https://wszystkoconajwazniejsze.pl/jan-sliwa-historia-polski/

The post Poland and Historians appeared first on Polonia Institute.

Poland is the target of a ‘false flag’ operation

Maciej Świrski

Introduction:  A seemingly domestic dispute, but actually an Active Measures operation

In May 2025, constitutionally mandated presidential elections were held in Poland, resulting in Karol Nawrocki being elected president, according to official and valid results. Although the elections were conducted in accordance with procedures, under the full supervision of the National Electoral Commission (Polish acronym: PKW) and without any significant objections from foreign observers, an unexpected and aggressive campaign to delegitimize the results began just a few days after the results were announced. This was, in fact, a continuation of what had already been happening during the election campaign – systematic undermining of the credibility of the process and discrediting of the main opposition candidate.

Immediately after the announcement of the results of the May presidential election, which, let us recall, were conducted in accordance with the law and did not raise any objections from either the PKW or international observers, increasingly loud accusations began to be made by politicians from the ruling coalition, led by the prime minister. The media and public speakers began to talk about a ‘manipulation,’ ‘systemic advantage,’ ‘election fraud,’ and even the ‘lack of a social mandate’ for the winning candidate.

It is hard not to get the impression that this reaction was not spontaneous, but rather a result of disappointment with the outcome. No new evidence emerged, no effective election protests were lodged, and the elections were not challenged in court. Nevertheless, a narrative offensive was launched, the aim of which was not to clarify any irregularities, but something much more serious: to systematically undermine confidence in the election results and in the office of the president, as such. The tone of these statements was not about correction or repair, but about depriving the president, who had been elected in a general election, of his legitimacy. This was a deliberately sustained message, delivered synchronously across multiple channels and devoid of any constitutional basis.

This is not a mere political conflict. Nor is it a normal political campaign. What we are witnessing has all the hallmarks of an Active Measures operation – disinformation and psychological operations designed to undermine citizens’ trust in the state, challenge the constitutional order, and weaken the structures of sovereignty. This is not about fair debate. It is about eroding the sense of reality and the meaning of collective action. We are under attack on a cognitive level, with a long-term goal of destroying national cohesion by dismantling trust in the fundamental institutions of the state.

The term Active Measures (Russian: Aktivnoye Mieropriyatya) comes from the arsenal of the Soviet KGB and is now used and developed by the Russian FSB and GRU services. It refers to a set of operational activities whose purpose is not to obtain information, as in classic espionage, but rather to actively shape reality in enemy states, especially by sowing chaos, undermining trust in institutions, stirring up social and ethnic conflicts, supporting extreme narratives on both sides of the dispute, and weakening the cohesion of the national community. It is a war without tanks, waged through narratives, emotions, leaks, pseudo-independent analyses, and so-called experts.

Very often, the perpetrators of such scenarios are politicians and journalists who are not agents but who, unknowingly, serve the interests of a foreign state. Their actions are often marked by resentment, ideological blindness or a desire for personal revenge. They can be divided into Class A, i.e., direct operations: sabotage, infiltration, bribery, and Class B, i.e., cognitive operations: disinformation, manipulation of public debate, sowing suspicion, and blurring reality. Poland is currently the target of Class B operations, which aim to destroy trust in elections – the most important mechanism for legitimising power in a democracy.

A false flag operation is a method that has been known for centuries. Its essence is impersonation: the aggressor pretends to be someone else – a victim, a democrat, a defender of freedom. They act ostensibly in the name of principles that they themselves destroy. In modern conflicts, operations of this type involve the services of a foreign state (e.g. Russia) causing chaos in an enemy country through its own citizens. They organise media coverage, construct false narratives, and inspire protests – but they do so in such a way as to make it look like a civil or democratic movement.

A false flag is precisely about deceiving
the public about the source of the actions

‘Defenders of democracy’ are created who, in fact, pursue the goals of the aggressor – they undermine legitimate elections, demand ‘state reform’, suggest the existence of a ‘deep state’ or call for the creation of extraordinary institutions to dismantle the existing order.

Such actions are not only destabilising but also dangerous in terms of the continuity of statehood. In the Polish constitutional system, for example, the president plays a fundamental role: he appoints judges and generals, represents the state internationally, serves as commander-in-chief of the armed forces, and safeguards the continuity of power. Attempting to delegitimise him without legal grounds is not just a constitutional dispute. It is an act that undermines the cohesion of the state as a whole.

In geopolitics, this is one of the most effective ways to weaken a nation’s ability to defend itself. A crisis of confidence in institutions erodes decision-making capacity, paralyses the political system, and paves the way for external intervention, whether legal, media-based, economic, or even military.

Such operations have been tested many times before. In the US in 2020-2021, attempts to delegitimise the presidential election results were partly inspired by Russian and Chinese disinformation, fuelled by both the far right and the far left. In Moldova in 2023, protests were organised against alleged fraud, even though the elections were recognised as legitimate by all international institutions. In Georgia and Ukraine, operations causing social unrest under the banner of ‘defending democracy’ led to deep crises that were exploited by external forces. The same signs appeared everywhere: false defenders of values, emotional moral rhetoric and calls for a ‘reset’ or ‘renewal of the state,’ with foreign services profiting in the background.

In Poland today, we are at the beginning of a similar scenario. This is not a political debate. This is not a normal argument. This is a cognitive war. And the 2025 presidential election is its first, frontal battlefield. We are facing a frontal attack on the foundations of our statehood.

This is why the events surrounding the presidential election today are of fundamental importance, both politically and in terms of the system and civilisation. In a constitutional system, the president is not merely a figurehead. The office embodies the continuity of the state, appoints judges and commanders, represents Poland internationally and upholds the Constitution. Attempting to strip the president of his legitimacy without any legal basis is not just a dispute over a person, but a blow to the very structure of the state. Such action does not remain confined to public debate.

If entrenched, it could lead to a constitutional crisis, which, with favourable media coverage and external pressure, could result in paralysis and, in extreme cases, constitutional chaos. What is today referred to as ‘the question of the rule of law’ may tomorrow become the question of whether Poland still exists as an integrated state entity.

That is why this war is not about elections.
It is about everything.

The Facts: what is happening – a sequence of events

What is unfolding before our eyes today is not a series of random events or the usual dynamics of a political dispute following presidential elections. We are dealing with a methodical sequence of actions which, when analysed as a whole, form a clear vector: the destabilisation of the constitutional order of the Republic of Poland.

The first and most visible element is the public questioning of the legality of Karol Nawrocki’s election as President of the Republic of Poland. Although the elections were held in accordance with constitutional procedures, and their results were confirmed by the National Electoral Commission (PKW) and not effectively challenged in any court, politicians from the ruling coalition launched a frontal campaign to delegitimise them. Accusations of alleged fraud and manipulation have been made, unsupported by any facts or new findings.

The next stage was to shift the focus from the election result itself to the very possibility of the president being sworn in. There was talk that the president could not take office, that a ‘constitutional pause’ or ‘temporary replacement’ by the Speaker of the Sejm was needed.

What is more, suggestions were made to replace the Speaker of the Sejm precisely so that the politician most involved in questioning the legality of Nawrocki’s election could de facto take over the role of the head of state. This is more than just rhetoric – it is an attempt to circumvent the constitutional mechanism through procedural violence, in which the Sejm majority is trying to seize prerogatives for which there is no constitutional basis.

At the same time, a coordinated attack is underway on legally functioning state institutions that remain outside the direct control of the government. Since the beginning of the term in 2023, the following institutions have been targeted: the Institute of National Remembrance (IPN), the National Broadcasting Council (KRRiT), the Constitutional Tribunal (TK) and the National Bank of Poland. It is worth noting that the National Broadcasting Council, the Constitutional Tribunal and the National Bank of Poland are constitutional bodies, and attacking them – undermining their existence, demanding ‘new compositions’ and refusing to respect their decisions – already bears the hallmarks of a constitutional coup. The IPN, although not mentioned in the constitution, is one of the last bastions of historical policy based on sovereignty and is therefore a target of disintegration efforts.

The fourth, extremely important thread, is the operation being carried out at the international level, with the participation of politicians from the ruling coalition. It consists of the systematic delegitimisation of Poland in European Union institutions through passivity, feigned diplomacy, and the deliberate avoidance of a firm defence of the national interest at a time when Europe is going through its greatest geopolitical crisis since the Second World War.

There is a war going on in Ukraine, Israel is striking Iran, Germany is intensifying its pressure for federalisation, and many EU member states are seeking strategic separation from the United States. At this very moment, Poland, as a NATO and EU border state, should be active, assertive, united and clear. Instead, we are faced with deliberate sluggishness, a lack of vision and external consent to gradually strip us of our sovereignty. Part of this process is taking place with the full consent or even cooperation of those in power, which is one of the most dangerous manifestations of this operation.

Finally, all of this takes place with full media synchronisation. At the same time, the topics of ‘illegal elections’, ‘fraud’ and ‘an unrecognised president’ appear in several major newsrooms. This message is not the result of natural development; it is more akin to orchestration, with identical vocabulary, emotional gradation and convergence of arguments and sources. In the context of cognitive warfare, this effect – a massive media onslaught designed to replace facts with emotions – constitutes the fundamental tool of modern influence operations.

This sequence — from undermining the election and attacking the inauguration to assaulting constitutional institutions, displaying international passivity, and synchronising the media — forms a coherent operation whose logic extends far beyond politics. It is an attack on the very essence of statehood.

Analysis: Features of Active Measures operations
– a textbook example

Observing the current political situation in Poland, it is difficult not to notice that we are dealing with an operation with an almost textbook structure and dynamics when it comes to Active Measures. In the classic Soviet approach – continued and developed today by the Russian FSB and GRU — such an operation does not consist of a single spectacular act of sabotage, but of long-term, coordinated and blurred cognitive action, the aim of which is not to convince anyone of a specific version of reality, but to undermine trust in any version of reality at all.

The first and most characteristic element of this operation is controlled disinformation. We are not dealing with blatant lies – on the contrary, what dominates are ‘questions’, insinuations, suggestions, rhetorical phrases such as ‘can we be sure?’, ‘was everything fair?’, ‘has the system been manipulated?’ This technique does not require evidence – all that is needed is to spread uncertainty. Journalists express ‘concern’, citizens ask ‘questions’, experts raise ‘doubts’ – all based on carefully measured language of understatement. As a result, it is not specific claims but the very atmosphere of suspicion that begins to dominate the public debate.

The second feature of the operation is cognitive warfare, which is not about determining who is right, but rather about destroying society’s ability to accept any argument as valid. Rather than pointing fingers, the aim is to ensure that nobody trusts the election results, that everyone doubts the fairness of the process and that the concept of ‘president’ becomes controversial.

Rather than attacking facts, this operation attacks trust itself as a social category. Consequently, there is no longer any common ground on which to agree, because ‘everyone has their own version’ and ‘no one knows what really happened’. In such an atmosphere, the state becomes ungovernable.

Another element is reversed axiology, whereby legal and constitutional actions are presented as allegedly undemocratic. In this mechanism, the executive or parliamentary authority attempts to strip the head of state of their legitimacy, despite them being elected in accordance with the law and with full transparency of procedures. The normal functioning of constitutional bodies, such as the Constitutional Tribunal, the National Bank of Poland and the National Broadcasting Council, is presented as a ‘threat to democracy’. This inverted language causes the public to confuse order with chaos and reform with abuse. In a climate of social fatigue and cognitive overload, it is easy to blur the boundaries of the rule of law under the guise of defending it.

Another important aspect of the operation is its multi-channel nature. Actions are not limited to a single medium or institution. Journalists, activists, politicians, ‘experts’, non-governmental organisations and, most importantly, external channels such as European Union institutions, foreign think tanks, and embassies all work in parallel. This creates a multi-voice effect that gives the illusion of widespread belief that ‘something is going on.’

In reality, this is the result of operational synchronisation, which is characteristic of mature forms of Active Measures. In classic warfare, actions are carried out on the front line. In cognitive warfare, the front line is the entire information reality – and everything that can shape beliefs.

Finally, and perhaps most dangerously, the vector is not indigenous.

All of these actions fit perfectly
into the geostrategic interests of
the Russian Federation and, indirectly, Germany.

From Moscow’s perspective, this operation is a tool for dismantling the statehood of a NATO country located on the eastern front, whose stability threatens plans to rebuild the sphere of influence. From Berlin’s perspective, the current turmoil serves to implement a model of federalisation of the European Union, in which Poland is symbolically disarmed and becomes a ‘contextual state’ – functioning only as an EU subsystem, rather than as an entity capable of opposition. In this sense, the Active Measures operation currently underway in Poland is not an experiment. It is part of a long-term strategy to break up Central Europe as the axis of resistance on the continent.

When we realise that each of the components described above was launched almost simultaneously – undermining the election results, attempts to block the swearing-in ceremony, attacks on constitutional institutions, international delegitimisation, a massive media campaign – it is difficult to talk about ordinary politics. This is no longer a dispute over power. These are actions recognisable in the operational history of Soviet and post-Soviet services. And unfortunately, Poland is once again becoming a battlefield where the goal is not to take over the government, but to destroy the very possibility of governing.

The logic of false flag– a war masquerading as democracy

One of the most disturbing aspects of the current events in Poland is their consistency with the classic pattern of false flag operations, i.e. actions carried out by one centre but disguised as another in order to confuse the observer, shift responsibility and create a narrative that disarms the victim before they even realise they are the target of an attack.

In this case, we are dealing with an operation carried out by people and political circles who present themselves as defenders of democracy, the rule of law and freedom, but whose actions, in terms of content, form, and effect – fit perfectly into the logic of cognitive aggression used by Russia for decades. This is no longer even inspiration – it is an operational blueprint.

The current sequence of events in Poland is inspired by recent precedents in other countries. For example, in the United States, after the 2020–21 presidential election, there was a violent campaign to question the result, stir up emotions, and divide society. This campaign was largely fuelled by troll farms in St Petersburg and Beijing. Russian cognitive operations actively promoted both right-wing and extremely progressive narratives to cause maximum emotional chaos and a loss of common ground.

In Ukraine in 2013-2014 and in Georgia, several attempts were made to undermine democratic processes in this way, portraying legally elected authorities as undemocratic, Western-controlled, corrupt, or illegal. In each of these cases, the mechanics were similar: a seemingly grassroots civil movement, radical moral language, the use of social media and local opinion leaders, and the complete alignment of actions with Moscow’s strategic goals.

In Poland, the same method has been used for years in a narrative in which the destruction of state institutions is presented as a ‘fight for freedom’ – which, as we remember, has been the case since the beginning of the PiS government.

Attempts to prevent the swearing-in of a legally elected president are supposedly a ‘defence of democracy’. Undermining the competence and legality of constitutional bodies – such as the National Broadcasting Council, the Constitutional Tribunal and the National Bank of Poland – is presented as ‘systemic reform’ and ‘restoring order’.

In fact, we are witnessing the opposite process: the dismantling of the constitutional pillars of the state under the guise of a fight for democracy. This is a classic strategy of reverse legitimacy – actions aimed at depriving the opponent of moral and legal legitimacy, regardless of facts and procedures. All this is being carried out by circles which, in the eyes of the public, present themselves as ‘democratic’, ‘pro-European’ or ‘progressive’.

This is what makes this operation a classic false flag: actions are carried out in the name of Western values, but the result is the breakdown of state structures, institutional chaos, international isolation and deep fragmentation of the national community – exactly what Moscow has wanted for thirty years.

A false flag does not work through force, but through authority. When those perceived as defenders of democracy carry out a scenario of weakening the state, society loses the ability to recognise who is really acting in its own interests and who is merely a tool in someone else’s game.

A false flag is therefore not just a tactic – it is a profound distortion of the symbolic space, in which aggression is called defence and the decay of institutions is called reform.

In this way, war no longer looks like war, and the victim begins to feel ashamed of their own defence. This is why cognitive operations are so difficult to recognise: they do not come in uniforms, but in suits; not with weapons, but with microphones; not under a red banner, but under a blue flag with yellow stars.

What is happening today in Poland is not fundamentally different from the operations previously carried out in the countries of Georgia, Moldova or the United States. Only the language and scenery change – the logic remains the same: disarm the state with its own language, question the legitimacy of its institutions with the help of its own citizens, and bring about a moment when no one knows who is telling the truth – and thus the truth ceases to matter. In such a cognitive vacuum, there is no need for tanks or missiles – all that is needed is well-designed chaos.

Organised networks of information diversion also play an extremely important role in this false flag operation, whose aim is not to convince anyone, but to blow up social cohesion from within. One of the most visible examples in Poland is the group operating under the slogan ‘Silni Razem’ (‘Strong Together’) – a group of seemingly spontaneous social media users who in reality act as a digital ideological militia tasked with attacking, discrediting and psychologically suppressing anyone who expresses views other than those accepted by the liberal-progressive mainstream. Such networks are not a civil movement in the classic sense. They operate using mechanisms familiar from information warfare: mass reproduction of messages, the use of memes as emotional weapons, personal harassment of opponents, and mass reporting of content hostile to their narrative to social media administrators. Members of these networks are often not professional trolls, but their behaviour is the product of deep cognitive indoctrination, reminiscent of the methods used by sects. A black-and-white language prevails, with no room for doubt, questions or nuance. Anyone who disagrees with the line is an enemy. And the enemy has no right to be in the public sphere. The enemy has no right to exist.

From a psychological point of view, ‘Strong Together’ is an example of a modern form of social cognitive automatism – a mechanism in which people do not interpret reality, but react to a set of learned signals, slogans and symbols. These are not active participants in the debate – they are terminals of a self-perpetuating programme. Their main function is not to convince neutral audiences, but to poison the debate so that no one wants to speak up.

Chilling effect, self-censorship, silence – these are the most valuable resources for information operations. Such networks – although presented as grassroots, spontaneous and ‘progressive’ – perform exactly the same function as organised diversionary groups that used to break up states from within in the past. They do not wear uniforms, but they have avatars. They do not use dynamite, but mass reporting to social media administrators about the ‘hate speech’ allegedly used by their opponents. Their weapon is not argument, but mockery, defamation and harassment. For the average internet user, encountering this machine means only one thing: the fear of speaking out. Where people are afraid to speak, the truth is the first casualty.

In this sense, networks such as ‘Silni Razem’ are a tool of third-generation cognitive aggression, not physical or informational, but identity-based. Their existence not only poisons the debate. They reconfigure concepts:

patriotism becomes ‘fascism’, sovereignty becomes ‘isolationism’, the constitution becomes ‘an obstacle to reform’

And that is precisely why they are becoming an informal infrastructure for false flag operations, disguised as ‘social opposition’ but in reality pursuing the logic of cognitive dismantling of the state by the decision-making centre of the entire operation – Moscow.

The strategic goals of Russia and Germany

To understand the deeper meaning of the operation to destabilise Poland, it is not enough to look at it solely through the prism of internal political struggle. It must be placed in a broader geopolitical context – as an instrument in the hands of two powers which, although seemingly antagonistic, are today working in parallel to weaken Poland as a sovereign political entity.

Russia and Germany, each for its own reasons, see Poland as an obstacle to the realisation of their long-term interests.

A strong, stable Poland, rooted in national consciousness and strategically anchored in an alliance with the US, is a problem for both neo-imperial Moscow and federalist Berlin. Therefore, the goal is no longer just to change the government or win the media narrative. The goal is something deeper: to dismantle the structure of Poland’s statehood.

From Russia’s point of view, the operation to destabilise Poland internally is part of a long-standing strategy to dismantle NATO’s security architecture on its eastern flank. Poland is the most important frontline state of the Alliance – in terms of population, geography, military and logistics. It is also a country connecting the Three Seas region – a project aimed at making Central Europe independent from the influence of Moscow and Berlin. For this reason, undermining Poland’s credibility – through constitutional chaos, questioning the legitimacy of the authorities and paralysing institutions – is becoming a key tool for disarming NATO without firing a single shot. If Poland is shown to be incapable of maintaining constitutional order, its voice in NATO will become less audible and its allies’ willingness to cooperate will be significantly reduced.

Russia is also seeking to disintegrate the Three Seas Initiative, seeing it as a threat to its plans to rebuild its sphere of influence. If Poland is discredited as a regional leader – through institutional crisis, military weakness and chaotic foreign policy – the Three Seas Initiative will collapse. Countries such as Romania, the Czech Republic and the Baltic states will be forced to look for other points of reference, and then pressure from Berlin and pragmatism towards Moscow will naturally emerge. In addition, the constitutional chaos in Poland is a tool for Russia to break down Polish national identity – the same identity that has been an obstacle to imperial projects in the region for centuries. A country that does not know who its legitimate president is, that undermines its own institutions and where patriotism is presented as a threat to democracy – such a country ceases to be an opponent. It becomes an open field to be conquered.

Germany, on the other hand, although it does not conduct hybrid activities with such an overt structure as Russia, is pursuing its goal methodically, through the institutional and axiological instruments of the European Union.

Berlin’s main goal is to regain its position as a metastate in Central Europe – not through tanks, but through treaties, regulations, legal control mechanisms and axiological pressure.

The key tool here is the European Union, whose institutions are increasingly being used as a mechanism to discipline member states rather than as a platform for equal partners. The revitalisation of Germany’s legal and ideological dominance is taking place through a system of pressure on the courts, the media, the energy sector, education and public finances. If Poland is forced to ‘repair its relations with the EU’ as a result of internal chaos, this will effectively mean accepting an externally imposed model of governance.

Berlin is primarily concerned about Poland’s energy independence, which is disrupting German plans to make the region dependent on gas and ‘green industry’ technologies controlled by German corporations. The Germans are also irritated by Poland’s historical policy, which reminds them of Germany’s responsibility for World War II, Yalta and the post-war erasure of Central Europe’s sovereignty. Revenge for independence – energy, symbolic and strategic – is not a figure of speech. It is Berlin’s policy pursued under the banner of ‘the rule of law’, ‘European values’ and ‘restoring trust’.

As a result, both countries – Russia and Germany – although acting with different methods and from different directions, currently have a common interest: to weaken Poland as a sovereign, culturally rooted and independent player. Russia wants chaos. Germany wants subordination.

Their goals are not mutually exclusive – they complement each other. And Poland, if it fails to understand this logic, will become a space devoid of decision-making capacity – both towards the East and the West. This is precisely why the operation to undermine the presidential election is not merely a domestic conflict. It is a key arena of 21st-century geopolitical competition in Central Europe.

In this context, one more key strategic goal of Germany should be added: the final invalidation and silencing of Polish demands for reparations for World War II. The issue of reparations, which has been consistently raised by the Polish authorities in recent years, not only reminds the world of Germany’s unresolved responsibility for crimes, destruction and occupation, but also poses a real threat to Berlin’s axiological hegemony within the European Union. In the eyes of the German political class, any recognition of Polish claims – even symbolic – would open a Pandora’s box that could call into question the foundations of Germany’s post-war ‘moral leadership’ in Europe.

Therefore, weakening Poland as a sovereign state, and especially as an entity capable of making historical claims, is a goal for Berlin that is not only political but existential. In a scenario of constitutional chaos, in which the legitimacy of the Polish authorities is questioned, any demand for reparations can be presented as ‘unrepresentative’, ‘discredited’ or ‘irresponsible’ – and, as a result, permanently invalidated on the international stage. Thus, the operation to delegitimise the Polish state serves not only to change the balance of power in Europe, but also to erase once and for all Germany’s uncomfortable reckoning with history.

From Berlin’s perspective, this would be a double triumph: firstly, a return to its role as the unquestioned decision-making centre of the EU, and secondly, the final silencing of an issue that could undermine the foundations of the post-WW2 political order, based on the silence surrounding the suffering of the peoples of Central Europe. Poland, confused, internally divided and internationally marginalised, will not be able to act as a voice demanding historical justice. And this, from the point of view of German raison d’état, is a strategic value of the highest order.

The issue of reparations is particularly important for Berlin right now because the newly elected Polish president, Karol Nawrocki, clearly and unequivocally declared during his election campaign that extracting reparations from Germany for World War II would be an important part of his presidential agenda. He pointed out that Poland, as a victim of the greatest armed conflict of the 20th century, can no longer remain silent about the fact that no serious compensation has ever been paid for the extermination of its citizens or for the destruction of its state, culture and infrastructure.

This announcement struck at the very heart of the German strategy of silence and delegitimisation of the issue of reparations. That is why, already during the election campaign, Karol Nawrocki became the target of an unprecedented wave of media and political attacks based on insinuations, half-truths and emotional demonisation. Even then, it was clear that the media narrative largely resonated with Berlin’s interests, and some journalists and politicians – personally, financially or ideologically linked to German institutions – began to openly question not only his views but also his right to hold the highest office in the state.

The current operation to delegitimise Karol Nawrocki’s election and prevent him from taking office is therefore a natural extension of this strategy. Moreover, these actions are supported by politicians, including the prime minister himself, who have been associated for years with German influence structures, think tanks and transnational organisations whose interest is not in a strong and independent Poland, but in a predictable, submissive and ‘Europeanised’ country.

These facts clearly show that the struggle to prevent a legally elected president from taking office has a specific German national interest behind it. It is not only about defending their historical narrative, but also about blocking the process of inter-state reckoning, which, given the precedent, could have a domino effect across Europe. Germany cannot afford this. That is why it is doing everything in its power to ensure that Poland, before it can demand justice, ceases to be treated as a country capable of articulating its own claims. The operation to delegitimise President Nawrocki is therefore a strategic protective mechanism for Berlin, carried out by others but very much in its own interest.

Escalation scenarios

If the current operation to delegitimise the legally elected President Karol Nawrocki is not stopped – either by state institutions or by public opinion – we must expect another phase of escalation, which could lead to a real breakdown of the constitutional order in Poland. Observing the logic of previous Active Measures operations in Central and Eastern Europe, as well as analysing internal political and media tensions, we can identify at least three possible – and simultaneously developing – scenarios for destabilisation.

Firstly: institutional escalation. After President Nawrocki is sworn in, we can expect attempts to invalidate his decisions ex post, especially regarding the appointment of judges, armed forces commanders and ambassadors. This will be achieved through Sejm resolutions, rulings by ‘alternative’ judicial structures, and referrals to international tribunals and EU bodies. The aim of such an operation will not be legal effectiveness – as its chances of success are slim – but to create interpretative chaos in which some institutions cease to recognise the decisions of others.

In such an environment, the concept of ‘legality’ disappears and the state becomes paralysed. This is a well-known technique for dismantling institutions, previously used, among other states,  in Moldova and Ukraine in 2005-2007. To some extent, this has been happening since the beginning of the term of office at the end of 2023 – examples include the illegal takeover of public media and the illegal appointment of an acting Deputy Prosecutor General.

Secondly: the use of the idea of election fraud as an emotional and axiological figure for the consolidation of the liberal-left camp. Just as the Smoleńsk disaster was a symbolic axis of mobilisation and memory for the patriotic side, so the ‘rigged elections of 2025’ could become a founding myth for the coalition circles, around which a political identity, a language of moral superiority and legitimacy for extraordinary measures are being built. In this view, President Nawrocki is not an opponent – he is a ‘product of fraud’, and therefore the rules of standard political play do not apply to him. This way of thinking can lead to the justification of unconstitutional actions, because a ‘higher truth’ demands extraordinary measures. This is dangerous because it blurs the lines between politics and staged rebellion. In the background, Russia’s kinetic actions against the main actors of the Polish patriotic milieu may be lurking, less visible in the fog of confusion caused by this turmoil.

Thirdly: the collapse of constitutional order and the emergence of parallel structures. As legal chaos grows, we can expect to see the re-emergence of so-called democracy defence committees – this time not as a protest movement, but as quasi-political and constitutional bodies that will begin to announce ‘alternative social verdicts, appoint ‘shadow presidents’ or organise ‘social tribunals’. This type of action has been tested before in Latin America, the Caucasus and Central Asia, always with the same result: the destruction of the authority of state institutions and the shift of the centre of decision-making to extra-legal structures.

In the Polish context, this would mean an attempt to install a political dual power: on the one hand, a legal president, and on the other, an informal but media and internationally-supported structure of ‘civil representation’. This would result in executive paralysis and deep social disorientation, which could be used as a pretext for further intervention by EU institutions – no longer in the form of dialogue, but of crisis management.

All three scenarios are not hypothetical – their elements are already appearing in the public, media and political sphere. Their full activation is merely an operational decision, either internal or external. In such a scenario, the state ceases to be the guarantor of order, instead becoming a field of competing narratives about legality, truth, and sovereignty. This is not a political difference of opinion. This is a systemic dismantling of statehood – carried out with kid gloves, but with the precision of a surgical knife cut.

Final diagnosis: Poland as a target of cognitive warfare

What we are seeing today in Poland – from the questioning of the legitimacy of the presidential elections, through the destabilisation of constitutional institutions, to the creation of parallel media and political narratives – is not a mere parliamentary crisis. This is not a dispute between parties, programmatic differences or controversial legislative decisions. We are dealing with a classic hybrid operation, conducted at the cognitive, institutional and symbolic levels, whose goal is not to gain power, but to invalidate the very meaning of state structures.

The cognitive war being waged against Poland today does not come dressed in uniform, nor is it announced in parliament or called a war campaign. Its aim is to destroy citizens’ ability to interpret political reality together. If we no longer know who has been legally elected, whom to trust, what is fact and what is narrative, then the basic code of social trust — without which no democratic order can be maintained — breaks down. This is the essence of cognitive warfare: disintegrating the space of meaning so that sovereignty can no longer be exercised effectively.

In this model, it is not about replacing one party with another or replacing the president with a more ‘European’ one. It is about something much deeper: it is about Poland ceasing to be perceived – and ceasing to perceive itself – as a sovereign state capable of acting independently within its own constitutional order. What is at stake in this operation is not the government, but the very identity of Poland. If the elections can be delegitimised, the functions of institutions blurred and the belief that everything is relative and nothing matters entrenched, then there will be no need to conquer territory. It will be enough for Poland to become a space without structure – a political body without a bone structure.

This is the direction taken by a concept which, although it has not been formally announced anywhere, is the informal goal of many European and Russian circles at the same time: to transform Poland into a ‘contextual state’. This means a country that does not exist as an independent strategic actor, but only as a function of larger structures – the EU, NATO, the Western energy market or the German industrial system.

The contextual state does not make decisions – it ‘reacts’ to reality. It does not shape relationships – it only “implements” them. It has no mission – it has a schedule of directives.

In such a model, strong constitutional institutions are unnecessary, a strong president is unnecessary, and a sovereign nation is unnecessary. All that is needed is an executive class, well synchronised with the interests of foreign and media centres, which maintains the appearance of democratic processes while in fact translating instructions into national regulations. Poland as a state ceases to be a subject. It becomes an environment. A functional territory.

And that is precisely why the operation to delegitimise the 2025 elections is not just another chapter in a political dispute. It is a decisive test of whether Poland will retain its ability to be a state in the classical sense – with a legitimate centre of power, functional institutions and a community capable of self-organisation – or whether it will undergo a process of decomposition that has already affected many peripheral countries. This test is ongoing. Everything indicates that we will not pass it unless we understand that we are the target of a war, even though no shots are being fired. This is a war for meaning. For legality. For memory. For existence.

Conclusion: building an epistemic shield

In the face of the cognitive warfare being waged against Poland — which aims to delegitimise the president and destroy the state’s capacity for self-determination — it is necessary to establish a new approach to national defence.

An army, missile systems and even advanced cybersecurity technologies are no longer enough. The threat has not come from across the border, but from perception. In this sense, cognition is becoming a new battlefield, and the protection of the state’s epistemic infrastructure a new strategic imperative.

Therefore, Poland must urgently begin the process of building an epistemic defence shield – a set of tools, structures and strategies aimed at recognising, neutralising and pre-empting cognitive and narrative operations of hostile origin. A key element of this strategy should be the establishment of a National Centre for Cognitive Operations Recognition (CROP) – an institution operating at the intersection of intelligence analysis, semiotics, social psychology and state security. The CROP would be tasked with monitoring the public space for the presence of Active Measures vectors, identifying disinformation matrices and locating channels of propagation (from troll networks to international centres of influence).

The second pillar of this new doctrine should be the development of a national cognitive resilience system, i.e. a network of educational and strategic institutions that teach how to recognise manipulation, decode persuasive techniques and understand the language of psychological operations. Such programmes should operate not only at the level of decision-making elites, but also in higher education, public media, and training for the administration and the military. The ability of society to recognise cognitive operations must become an element of Polish national security.

The third – and perhaps most important – step is to fully recognise the cognitive domain as equivalent to the military and cyber domains. This means the need to create a strategic doctrine of cognitive defence, whose goal will not be censorship, but building resilience, strengthening social cohesion and protecting the state’s ability to articulate its own narrative. In this doctrine, an attack on an institution through false narratives is tantamount to an attack on critical infrastructure, and its neutralisation should be treated with the same priority as defence against a missile attack.

However, it should be clearly stated that none of these reforms will be possible as long as those who participate in the destruction of the constitutional order remain in power. The current political elites from the ruling coalition, who themselves are engaged in activities that undermine the foundations of sovereignty, delegitimise elections, attack constitutional institutions and support cognitive operations of hostile origin, are not only incapable of building such a shield, but also constitute its main threat. Their exercise of power today is a real risk to the existence of the Republic of Poland as a state.

Therefore, the first step towards rebuilding cognitive security is to remove these people from power in a manner consistent with the constitution, but decisive and irreversible. Only then can we begin to build a new, sovereign cognitive immunity system that will not only protect Poland from Active Measures operations, but also make it the subject of its own narrative, rather than its passive recipient. Without this, Poland will remain a state that knows its territorial borders but loses control over the borders of consciousness.

And this is precisely the goal of every cognitive war: to conquer a country not by force, but by destroying its meaning.

This text was originally published in Polish here:

https://wpolityce.pl/polityka/733158-wojna-o-legalnosc-polska-jako-cel-operacji-false-flag

The post Poland is the target of a ‘false flag’ operation appeared first on Polonia Institute.

Report of the Hudson Institute on the state of democracy under the Tusk government

February 18, 2025

If KO argues that it must “restore the constitutional order” because PiS-appointed judges in the Constitutional Tribunal are aligned with its views, would that not also require restoring the rule of law in the United States, where judges have been appointed politically since the early years of the republic?

If Polish judges are unfit for office because of their association with a political party, what are we to think about the president of the German Constitutional Court, who was vice-chair of the Christian Democratic Union Caucus in the Bundestag until just before his appointment to the court in 2018?

See the full report in pdf here:

When+Democrats+Govern+Undemocratically+-+The+Case+of+Poland+-+Boyse+-+Doran+-+Feb+2025

The post When Democrats Governm Undemocratically – The Case of Poland appeared first on Polonia Institute.

by the left-wing government of Donald Tusk in Poland

Ordo Juris Report dated February 2025

Violations of the rule of law by the Tusk Government

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Tomasz Żodzik

Comment published on LinkedIn, June 24, 2024

The Polish Sejm was unable to ratify the agreement of 08.2008 with the United States on the anti-missile shield over Poland for 13 months and it was not a coincidence. Again, I will support myself with Wikileaks and a secret cable from the US ambassador: the Presidential Palace (of Lech Kaczynski) was ready to give up the laurels of the victory of the PO/PSL coalition, if only they would finally ratify this agreement.  But attempts to renegotiate the agreement, setting ridiculous conditions, such as fantasies after the possible dissolution of the base about cleaning up after oneself, garbage collection, or land reclamation irritated the White House to such an extent that Obama terminated this agreement to the delight of Putin, Macron and Merkel who have achieved their goal – another small step towards EU integration from Gibraltar to the Urals.

We have a gas war between the UA and the RU, and the Polish prime minister for the first time since 1991 breaks with the Giedroyc doctrine and instead of going to Kiev, he unexpectedly flew first to Moscow in February 2008, and only in March 2008… to Washington. Meanwhile, Putin is not idle: he attacks Georgia, and on September 1, 2009, at Westerplatte, he justifies the USSR’s attack on Poland and the Katyn massacre as revenge for the death of Soviet soldiers from typhus in 1920…

In January 2010, Poland forgave Gazprom the debt in the shocking amount of PLN 1.2 billion. The pragmatic line had no end because in April 2010 “Prigozhin’s plane” had an unfortunate accident and the investigation in this case was handed over to the well-known democrat Prosecutor General of Russia Yuri Chaika.

Chaika has so far been known for such achievements as the case of Politkovskaya, Litvinenko, or the penal colony for Khodorkovsky – but Poland does not stop here and in September 2010 Poland invites Lavrov to give a lecture to all summoned Polish ambassadors on how to represent Poland abroad. It seems as not a big deal, but since the times of Tsarina Catherine, there has not been such a situation.

Putin’s media wrote in 2008 about Prime Minister Tusk that Moscow has its own man in Warsaw, but the hit was in 2012, when the head of the Russian Central Election Commission Vladimir Churov accused of electoral fraud in Russia was a guest of the Polish National Electoral Commission to teach the Poles how to conduct elections.

There was no end to the rapprochements: in 2010, Poland began to talk with Rosatom about importing energy from the planned new nuclear power plant in Kaliningrad

Not much, because maybe you remember shale gas, which was supposed to make us a power? It turns out that environmental organizations protesting against shale gas in the Lublin region were paid by Russia, just as the delegation of the Greens from the European Parliament took money from Gazprom for it. British and American companies had to deal with organized sabotage by Soviet henchmen aka Occupy Chevron. The head of the Greens faction in Europe, Rebecca Harms, appeared to protest in Poland, hostile to shale gas and… nuclear power.

Chevron and Exxon were waiting for some moves by the Polish government that would encourage the American giants to stay in our country permanently. However, there were none. The opposite happened. The country’s chief geologist cooled down the enthusiasm of the USA and presented his own “report”, where he estimated our gas… much more modestly than the American agency did. After some 400 protests, the Americans finally left…

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Arguments pointing to Russian pressure to lie

1. Radosław Sikorski and his press spokesman said that the cause of the disaster was the plane hitting trees. This theory was presented by representatives of the embassy and, above all, General Wiśniewski, head of the Polish attaché and former agent of the communist military services;

2. A similar theory was also presented by former SB officer Tomasz Turowski, sent by Sikorski as the organizer of Lech Kaczyński’s visit, who claimed that the plane hit a radio beacon and was destroyed;

3. At 11.15 AM the nationwide television TVN24 presents an interview with Mr. Szulc from Wrocław, who states that the cause of the disaster was the decision of the pilots, under pressure from the authorities on the plane, to land at all costs. All these messages were fraudulent transmissions sent by the Russian secret services. At that time no one knew or could have known the records of conversations between pilots, the authorities on the plane, and flight controllers. Today we know that in these conversations there is no evidence of any pressure to land.

4. The primary concern for Polish Prime Minister Donald Tusk was his belief that the greatest danger for Poland was that the Polish people could suspect the Russians for causing the crash and that no one should “assume that the Russians could have been responsible for the Smolensk tragedy”. No one should ask Russia to transfer to Poland even a part of the investigation of this disaster, the right of Poland assured by international laws. The position of the Tusk government was that the investigation of Russia’s responsibility may lead to war, thus it must not be conducted. Finally, Tusk announced that he takes full responsibility for all the consequences of the outcome of this investigation. These assumptions of D. Tusk were the reason for handing over the entire investigation to the Russians and for agreeing by the Polish side to falsify the cause of the Smolensk tragedy.

5. This fear of Russia was the source of Tusk’s decision to conduct the investigation under the Chicago Convention, which in fact does not even apply to a state aircraft like the Polish Air Force One destroyed in Smolensk. This decision meant giving Russia all competencies in investigating the Smolensk tragedy, disposing of the wreckage and other evidence in Russia, and authoring the report. The government confirmed the approval of the Chicago Convention on April 10, and Tusk conveyed this decision when meeting Putin at night on April 10 in Smolensk. On April 16, this decision, and at the same time the rejection of the bilateral investigation agreement that was in force between Poland and Russia, were confirmed in writing by the Polish government commission supervising the investigation of this disaster.

6. As a consequence of this decision officers of the civilian and not military investigation commission were sent to Smolensk, headed by its chairman E. Klich, who assumed the responsibility of the representative of the Polish side from the very beginning. Among these investigators, there were no soldiers of the military commission charged with investigating such state and military plane disasters. Bogdan Klich, with the consent of Prime Minister Tusk, delayed the appointment of this commission 6 days, officially establishing it on the evening of April 15, although its members arrived in Smolensk on the evening of April 11.

7. The purpose of these actions was to enable the Russians to falsify the evidence and accuse Polish pilots. This was possible due to the behavior of D. Tusk’s representatives, who observed the destruction and falsification of evidence by the Russians without any reaction. The first key decision of the Polish side was made on the evening of April 10 when E. Klich’s illegal consented to the Russians taking over the black boxes to Moscow without any Polish oversight. Meanwhile, in the afternoon of April 10, Russian radio reported that the boxes had already been examined. E. Klich, D. Tusk’s representative, clearly stated on April 10 that he was aware of this situation.

8. Polish prosecutors on April 10/11 did not undertake any examination, instead they observed Russian forgeries. But they signed a document stating that the Russians gave them the right to examine the bodies and the wreckage. That is why, for example, they did not take into account the fact that the left door no. 823 of the airplane was driven one meter deep into the ground.  The Polish so-called Miller Commission failed to disclose and take into account any of the key facts.

9. Polish representatives who were supposed to examine black boxes with the Russians did not do so. There was only one Polish officer in the examination room. He confirmed that he was not allowed to listen to the entire recording but only to a few fragments of the CVR. Poles never had access to the original CVR or the original records from flight data recorders.

10. The Russian side did not give the Poles access to the main evidence or to fly around the airport to check the operation of the aircraft landing reception system.

11. The Polish side rejected the proposal of assistance and cooperation offered by NATO, the EU, and the USA. This latest proposal was made by the US ambassador on behalf of the US President before 12 noon on April 10, i.e. before the government meeting. The US offer to help was not communicated to the members of this meeting. The decision to reject support from NATO countries was approved directly on behalf of Donald Tusk by Minister Arabski, prosecutor K. Parulski, chairman E. Klich, Minister of National Defense B. Klich, and Minister of Foreign Affairs Radosław Sikorski. The consequence was that this investigation was left exclusively to Russia and the truth about the course of the disaster was very well covered up and hidden from the public.

12. On April 13, Prime Minister of the Russian Federation Putin decided and announced during the meeting of his committee that the Polish representative under the Chicago Convention would be E. Klich, who refused to allow Polish specialists to undertake or demand access to the key evidence, including digging part of the area to check fragments stuck in the ground. This decision highlighted Putin’s relationship with Tusk and Putin’s position on the Smolensk investigation.

13. This is important because on April 16, B. Klich and Tusk received an analysis from a Polish meteorology specialist indicating that the fault was on the Russian side because they were obliged to close the airport due to the weather and did not do so. This position was rejected by the Minister of National Defense, B. Klich, emphasizing that such hypotheses cannot be formulated at this time.

14. Immediately after the disaster, D. Tusk’s party promoted the position that it was the Poles’ fault and that the Russians were doing everything they could to support Poland.  What is more, the message was conveyed that the pilots were to blame for this crash. Gen. Petelicki revealed to the public that the Tusk party members received information that the Smolensk disaster was the pilots’ fault. General Petelicki was found dead with the gun wound to his head soon thereafter.

15. Tusk also decided not to demand that the Russians hand over the study or airplane fragments, although the Chicago Convention anticipated it and PiS – the Polish opposition party demanded it. To prevent it the Tusk’s MPs voted in the Sejm that the Polish government would not request this documentation.

16. After the publication of the first version of the Russian so-called Anodina report, which was accepted by E. Klich, Polish investigation commission KBWLLP members prepared a position paper indicating that the thesis about the pilots’ guilt is false. Tusk informed Putin and Medvedev about this. Putin brutally rejected it, and the negotiations led to Tusk’s resignation from the truth presented in the position paper and his declaration in the Sejm on January 19, 2011, that the fault was the actions of the Polish pilots and the pressure from “representatives of the authorities” on the plane. The Chairman of the Polish Investigative Commission Jerzy Miller accepts this approach and recommends to the committee that the established information about the Russians’ guilt presented in the position paper not be taken into account. Instead, the Russian version of events should be accepted;

17. This acquiescence to the Smolensk lie was a part of the broader negotiations, whereas the Russians agreed to the Russian-German-Polish alliance, the strategy implemented till June of 2014 as part of the arrangements in Königsberg, Moscow, Warsaw, St. Petersburg, and Berlin.

18. Clear and indisputable evidence of the attack by an explosion on board the Polish Airforce One in Smolensk, Russia, is the identification of plastic explosive markers, i.e. those used for attack operations. The law on the obligation to use tracers in explosives was adopted by many countries.  In Poland, it was adopted in 2008.As a result of the work of the Polish Subcommittee for Reinvestigation of the Smolensk Crash established in 2016 by a new Polish government, another very important piece of evidence was discovered. Through the reconstruction of the damage to the airplane and the identification of more than a hundred fragments of the plane, including parts of the seats, it was possible to identify the location of the explosions. Also, the explosion in the wing 100 meters before the so-called birch tree that was supposed to cut the wing was proven beyond any doubt. The subcommittee determined that this birch tree could not cut off the wing of this airplane. This version of events was false and fictitious. The birch tree in Smolensk was not damaged by the impact of the airplane but was simply broken.

19. Tusk’s supporters continue to deceive the public opinion about the Subcommittee’s work, including the popular lie promoted by TVN that the Subcommittee hid part of the NIAR report. Meanwhile, the author of this lie recently admitted that it is impossible to refer to the NIAR report because there was no such thing as the NIAR report in accordance with the terms of the NIAR – Polish Ministry of National Defense agreement.

 Translation from Polish by Polonia Institute

Zbrodnia i Kłamstwo Smoleńskie

Argumenty wskazujące na rosyjską presję kłamstwa

1. Radosław Sikorski i jego rzecznik prasowy przekazują, że przyczyną katastrofy było uderzenie samolotu w drzewo. Tezę tę przekazali przedstawiciele ambasady a przede wszystkim gen. Wiśniewski szef polskiego ataszatu i b. agent wojskowych służb komunistycznych;

2. Podobne tezy przekazywał także wysłany przez Sikorskiego jako organizator wizyty Prezydenta Lecha Kaczyńskiego w Katyniu w 2010 roku b. funkcjonariusz SB Tomasz Turski twierdzący, że samolot uderzył w radiolatarnię i został zniszczony;

3. TVN24 o g. 11.15 prezentuje wywiad z p. Szulcem z Wrocławia, który stwierdza, że przyczyną katastrofy była decyzja pilotów pod presją przedstawicieli władzy znajdujących się w samolocie, aby jak najszybciej lądować. To wszystko było przekazywaniem kłamstw rosyjskich służb specjalnych bo nikt jeszcze wówczas nie znał zapisów rozmów pilotów z kabiny. Dziś wiemy, że w zapisach tych rozmów nie ma ani słowa o presji lądowania;

4. Podstawową decyzją rządu D. Tuska było przyjęcie tezy, że największym niebezpieczeństwem dla Polski jest to, że „Polacy podejrzewają Rosjan o zamach” a nie wolno „zakładać, że to Rosjanie mogli być odpowiedzialni za tragedię smoleńską”. Dlatego też nie należy się zwracać do Rosji o przekazanie Polsce badania choćby części katastrofy, co przewidywała nawet Konwencja Chikagowska. Twierdzili, że ponieważ badanie odpowiedzialności Rosji może doprowadzić do wojny więc nie wolno tego badać, i wreszcie, że to on – Donald Tusk – przejmuje pełną odpowiedzialność za wszystkie konsekwencje tych badań. Te założenia D. Tuska były przyczyną oddania Rosjanom śledztwa smoleńskeigo i zgody na fałszowanie przyczyn tragedii smoleńskiej;

5. Takie było źródło decyzji Putina i Tuska o przyjęciu konwencji chicagowskiej jako procedury badania katastrofy. Oznaczało to oddanie Rosji wszystkich kompetencji w zakresie badania tej tragedii narodowej, dysponowania wrakiem i innymi dowodami w Rosji wedlug uznania oraz autorstwa raportu. Aprobatę konwencji chicagowskiej potwierdził rząd Tuska już 10 kwietnia a Tusk przekazał Putinowi te wiadomość jeszcze nocą 10 kwietnia w Smoleńsku. 16 kwietnia decyzję tę i odrzucenie umowy wspólnego badania potwierdziła pisemnie komisja rządowa RP nadzorująca badanie katastrofy;

6. Konsekwencją tej decyzji było wysłanie do Smoleńska funkcjonariuszy cywilnej komisji badania katastrof lotnicznych na czele z jej przewodniczącym E. Klichem, który od początku zakładał odpowiedzialność strony polskiej. Wśród tych funkcjonariuszy nie było żadnego żołnierza wojskowej komisji mającej obowiązek badać katastrofę samolotu Polskich Sil Powietrznych,  a więc takiego jaki uległ katastrofie w Smolensku. Tę cywilną komisję do spraw badania katastrofy Smolenskiej B. Klich jako szef MON za zgodą premiera Tuska powołał dopiero po 6 dniach, wieczorem 15 kwietnia, choć jej żołnierze przyjechali do Smoleńska już wieczorem 11 kwietnia;

7. Celem tych działań było umożliwienie Rosjanom fałszowania badań i oskarżenie polskich pilotów. Wynika to z zachowania przedstawicieli D. Tuska, którzy bez żadnej reakcji obserwowali niszczenie i fałszowanie przez Rosjan materiałów dowodowych. Kluczową decyzją była wieczorem 10 kwietnia bezprawna zgoda E. Klicha na przejęcie przez Rosjan czarnych skrzynek do Moskwy. Tymczasem po południu 10 04 radio rosyjskie przekazało, że skrzynki już zaczęto badać. E. Klich przedstawiciel D. Tuska wyraźnie stwierdził 10 04, że orientuje się w tej sytuacji;

8. Polscy prokuratorzy 10 /11 kwietnia nie podjęli żadnego badania i obserwowali rosyjskie fałszerstwa, choć podpisali dokument stwierdzający, że Rosjanie dali im prawo badania ciał i wrakowiska. Dlatego np. nie uwzględnili wbicia w ziemię na metr drzwi samolotu nr. 823. Komisja Millera nie ujawniła i nie uwzględniła żadnego z tych faktów;

9. Polscy reprezentanci mający badać z Rosjanami czarne skrzynki nie robili tego. W izbie badania był tylko jeden funkcjonariusz, który akceptował, że nie umożliwiono mu wysłuchania całego zapisu a jedynie kilku fragmentów CVR. Polacy nigdy nie mieli dostępu do oryginału CVR ani do oryginału zapisów parametrów;

10. Strona rosyjska nie dała Polakom możliwości dostępu do głównych materiałów a także do oblotu lotniska i sprawdzenia działania systemu przyjmowania lądowania samolotu;

11. Polska strona odrzuciła propozycję współpracy z NATO, UE i USA. Ta ostatnia propozycja została przekazana przez ambasadora USA w imieniu Prezydenta jeszcze przed g. 12 10 kwietnia a więc przez posiedzeniem rządu, któremu tego nie przekazano. Decyzję odrzucenie wsparcia państw NATO zaaprobowali bezpośrednio w imieniu Donalda Tuska minister Arabski, prokurator K. Parulski, przewodniczący E. Klich oraz minister MON B. Klich i minister spraw zagranicznych Radosław Sikorski. Konsekwencją było pozostawienie badań wyłącznie Rosji i ukrycie prawdy o przebiegu katastrofy;

12. 13. 04 Premier FR Putin zdecydował i ogłosił podczas posiedzenia swojej komisji, że reprezentantem Polski w ramach konwencji chicagowskiej będzie E. Klich, który odmawiał polskim specjalistom podejmowania lub domagania się kluczowych badań, w tym przekopania części terenu celem sprawdzenia fragmentów wbitych w ziemie. Ta decyzja podkreśliła relacje Putina z Tuskiem i stanowisko Putina w zakresie badań katastrofy;

13. To o tyle ważne, że 16 kwietnia B. Klich i Tusk otrzymali od polskiego specjalisty meteorologii analizę wskazującą, że winni byli Rosjanie, którzy ze względu na złą pogodę mieli obowiązek zamknąć lotnisko a tego nie uczynili. To stanowisko odrzucił minister ON B. Klich podkreślając, że w tym czasie badań nie wolno takich hipotez formułować;

14. Natychmiast po katastrofie środowisko D. Tuska upowszechniało w polskim spoleczenstwe tezę, że to wina Polaków a Rosjanie robią wszystko co mogą by wspierać Polskę. Co więcej przekazywali tezę, że winni są piloci. Jak wiadomo Gen. Petelicki ujawnił publicznie, że PO instrułuje swoich członkow by mówili, że to wina pilotów. Wkrotce potem General Petelicki został znaleziony martwy w garażu swego domu z raną postrzałową w głowie;

15. Tusk podjął też decyzję, że nie będzie domagał się od Rosjan przekazania badania, ani jego fragmentów choć konwencja chicagowska to przewidywała a PiS tego zażądał. Posłowie Tuska przegłosowali w Sejmie, że rząd RP nie będzie zwracał się o to do Rosji;

16. Po publikacji pierwszej wersji raportu Anodiny, który zaakceptował E. Klich, Polscy członkowie KBWLLP przygotowali stanowisko wskazujące, że teza o winie pilotów jest fałszywa. Tusk informuje o tym Putina i Miedwiediewa. Putin odrzuca to brutalnie a negocjacje doprowadzają do rezygnacji Tuska z prawdy i do deklaracji w Sejmie 19 stycznia 2011 r., że winą było działanie pilotów i presja „przedstawicieli władz” czyli Dowódcy Polskich Sił Lotniczych Generała Andrzeja Błasika oraz Prezydenta Polski Lecha Kaczyńskiego. Jerzy Miller akcepuje ten przekaz i poleca swojej komisji, aby nie brać pod uwagę ustalonych informacji o winie Rosjan, lecz należy zgodzić się na tezę rosyjską;

17. Dzieje się tak dlatego, że Rosjanie w ramach negocjacji zgadzają się na sojusz rosyjsko-niemiecko-polski, który jest potem jeszcze realizowany do czerwca 2014 r. w ramach ustaleń w Królewcu, Moskwie, Warszawie, Petersburgu i w Berlinie;

18. Jednoznacznym i bezspornym dowodem zamachu w Smolensku za pomocą eksplozji jest identyfikacja znaczników materiałów wybuchowych plastikowych, czyli służących do operacji zamachowych. Ustawa o obowiązku stosowania znaczników w materiałach wybuchowych była przyjęta także przez Polskę jeszcze w 2008 r. Dzięki gigantycznej pracy Podkomisji ds Ponownego Zbadania Zdarzenia Lotniczego w Smolensku bardzo ważnym materiałem dowodowym jest też rekonstrukcja zniszczeń samolotu oraz identyfikacja ponad stu fragmentów samolotu, w tym części foteli zniszczonych wybuchem. Ważne jest także identyfikacja i zanalizowanie wybuchu w skrzydle 100 metrów przed brzozą i jednoznaczne  udowodnienie, że tezy o uderzeniu w brzozę są błędne i fikcyjne. Dziś wiemy ponad wszelką wątpliwość, że brzoza w Smoleńsku nie została przecięta od uderzenia skrzydła samolotu lecz zwyczajnie złamana.

19. Środowisko D. Tuska do dziś oszukuje opinię publiczną an temat przyczyn tragedii smoleńskiej oraz na temat pracy Podkomisji. Powołując się na informację TVN dyskredytuje Podkomisję jakoby ta ukryła część raportu NIAR. Tymczasem autor tej tezy sam przyznał, że powoływanie się na tezy raportu NIAR jest niemożliwe, gdyż takiego raportu w ramach realizacji umowy NIAR z MON po prostu nie było.

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We ask Americans for help in obtaining WWII reparations from Germany.

Poland – the greatest victim of Nazi Germany – is the only country not compensated for enormous losses!

This is a moral imperative to compensate Polish victims for German atrocities in WWII!

You can find this document in pdf here:  Germany owes Poland WWII Reparations!

Also see: https://poloniainstitute.net/recommended/germany-paid-reparations-to-all-ocuppied-countries-except-poland/

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Germany has signed reparations and compensation agreements with all the countries it occupied. They paid money everywhere, the exception is Poland – says historian, prof. Bogdan Musiał in an interview with the DoRzeczy.pl portal.

Prof. Bogdan Musiał: For me – although I think not only for me but probably for all Poles – the most important thing was the issue of reparations. Prime Minister Tusk said that for the current government, the issue of reparations is de facto closed. However here a certain loophole was left by the head of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Radosław Sikorski, who said that Poland deserves some compensation from Germany, which is why Poland will ask Germany to handle this matter. We have reduced ourselves to the role of petitioners in this matter, which is sad and a mistake.

Why?

We don’t have to ask. We have the right to demand, and additionally, we can take legal action to demand, payment of reparations as compensation. It is worth pointing out that German courts in the 1950s and 1960s “secondarily” legalized crimes against Poles, e.g. in Auschwitz, where the Germans shot Poles based on “sentences” of police summary courts at the death wall. German courts secondarily approved and legitimized this crime. This is not talked about at all, but the rehabilitation of these murdered people is necessary.

However, if those murdered are rehabilitated, the second priority is compensation. This is written in the German Criminal Code. If we have unlawful judgments, and this was the case, then their victims or their descendants, because it is hereditary, are entitled to compensation in this respect. These debts can be challenged in German courts. However, no one cared about it, even though it would be the beginning of the road to reparations, because the scale of German judicial crimes during World War II was huge, and German courts later legalized it after the war.

Can we understand that since the topic is closed for Poland, the Polish government is only asking, then Germany will probably not do anything about it?

Not necessarily. I believe that Germany will do something. The public debate raises the question of contributing to the reconstruction of the Saxon Palace. Only in this case, I ask: if the Germans want to contribute to the reconstruction, why don’t they want to pay for the destruction of the entire Warsaw? How was the destruction of the Saxon Palace different from other buildings that were deliberately destroyed by German sappers? What is also important here is the fact that Germany has signed reparations and compensation agreements with all the countries it occupied. They paid money everywhere, the exception being Poland. The Germans know it perfectly well that what they paid to others in the 1950s and 1970s, today they would have to pay triple to Poland for the scale of their crimes. Additionally, we know from their internal documents that they are aware of this.

Are we talking about documents from the highest levels?

Yes. This was not written by an ordinary official. In August 1970, an internal inter-ministerial meeting on this matter was held. The ministers and undersecretaries of state from the ministries of economy, foreign affairs, and interior got acquainted with them and came to the conclusion that there was no possibility for Germany not to pay compensation to Poland. However, the then-German Chancellor Willy Brandt arranged with Moscow so that Poland would stop demanding reparations. It happened. Gomułka was ordered not to fool around and not to make any demands for reparations. Then the case was banned for Gierek by the Kremlin, or more precisely, Andropov blocked the reparations by the KGB. Unfortunately, after the fall of communism, no Polish government dared to raise this issue until 2022.

Has the topic been closed?

Donald Tusk and Radosław Sikorski know perfectly well that they must waive reparations in writing, in a bilateral agreement. I don’t think they will. This opens the way to fight for reparations in the future.

The original text in Polish was published here: https://dorzeczy.pl/opinie/549615/prof-musial-droga-do-reparacji-od-niemiec-jest-ciagle-otwarta.html

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