For a long time, they were a closely guarded secret. Now the US National Archives and Records Administration (NARA) has made the NSDAP membership files (Hitler’s National Socialist Workers’ Party that existed from 1920 to 1945) available online, largely preserved, for the whole world to see. The NSDAP membership files have been made fully accessible for the first time since World War II.

According to NARA, these files are copies of biographical records of the Berlin Document Center’s (BDC) National Socialist German Labor Party (NSDAP) materials and constitute the BDC’s principal sources concerning membership and activities of the NSDAP.

The records for the most part document three basic categories of information, such as membership in the NSDAP; membership in specific professional organizations sponsored by or associated with the NSDAP, and activities of the German Nazi judiciary system.

The NSDAP membership records, sometimes collectively known as the “Master File,” consist of central and special registries and card indexes. Within the “Master File” included are Anträge, Ortsgruppenkartei, Zentralkartei, Party Census (Berlin), Warnkartei, NSDAP Schwarze Listen, and Mitglieder-Sammelstelle der NSDAP. These files record essential biographical and Party membership data for each individual.  More information about the NARA collection on the German Nazi archival collection can be found here: https://catalog.archives.gov/id/12044361

Historical sensation

As reported by NARA, it is possible right now to browse, without registration, “millions of cards with names, dates of birth, membership numbers, dates of joining, and in some cases also portrait photographs of National Socialist Party comrades, both male and female” on the NARA website here:

https://catalog.archives.gov/search-within/12044361

The publication provides insight—though incomplete, because not one hundred percent of the files have survived—into the records of those Germans who, at least on paper, supported the rule and crimes of Germany until 1945.

Many German families remain silent about their ancestors. Today, they can investigate their relatives more easily than ever before.

The German weekly calls the publication of the files a “historical sensation.”

Were the (great-)grandparents Nazis?

By 1945, about 8.5 million Germans—both women and men—had joined the NSDAP. For each member, the party kept several personal data cards: one in the central register in Munich and another in local registers in the places where members lived and belonged to the party.

NSDAP bureaucrats filled out the cards meticulously. The fact that they survived the war is owed to one man: Hanns Huber, director of a paper mill in Munich-Freimann, who, shortly before the end of the war, ignored the party’s order to destroy tons of files and instead hid them in waste paper.

This way, about 80 percent of the files were preserved at least in the local registers maintained for territorial units called “Gau”. After the war, they were confiscated by the American army and transferred to a specially established archive in West Berlin, the Berlin Document Center.

There, the Allies used the files during denazification procedures. This made it almost impossible to deny membership in the NSDAP. In the 1990s, the Americans returned the documents to the German state, making copies for themselves; today they are located in the Federal Archives in Berlin-Lichterfelde.

Germany and “privacy protection”

The German Federal Archives have already digitized these files in the central register and the local registers, but so far cannot make them publicly available online because of the NSDAP members’ right to privacy. In Germany, this protection expires only ten years after a person’s death or 100 years after their birth.

For the youngest NSDAP members born before 1928, this would mean that the last deadlines will expire in 2028. “The goal of the Federal Archives is, of course, to make the entire register available after the protection periods have expired,” a spokesperson said. However, she did not provide an exact date.

Americans outpace German archives

Now the German Federal Archives have been overtaken by the American National Archives. Americans copied the microfilms in the 1990s and have now almost completely digitized them. They made the lists available online at the end of February 2026.

“The American archive did not create media hype around the publication, even though the dataset is not only historically important but also extremely extensive—nearly 16.3 million digitized documents,” wrote Der Spiegel.

Not easy to search among millions of files

Using the search engine on the site, in theory, you can reach an NSDAP membership card with just a few clicks. However, the search interface is not easy to use. “Those expecting a user-friendly database may be disappointed,” writes the German weekly.

“It looks simple, but the search does not work as easily as in Google,” says historian Martin Clemens Winter from the University of Leipzig in an interview with the German weekly. In recent weeks, he has intensively used the digitized NSDAP membership files as part of his research on the Leipzig armaments company HASAG. In the sources, he managed to find several company employees and supervisors from their forced labor camps about whom he previously had no data.

Winter warns that one “should not have overly high expectations” of the American archive. Although full-text search allows millions of entries to be searched and automatic text recognition can even decipher old German handwriting, the system does not work flawlessly. “I see the danger that especially laypeople may be disappointed when they find nothing,” Winter says.

On the Bluesky platform and on his blog, Winter has repeatedly posted tips, discoveries, and context. One user on Reddit has also compiled initial instructions on how to use it. See here: https://www.reddit.com/r/Genealogy/comments/1rqvwns/nara_has_put_the_membership_card_file_of_the/

Key information: date of joining the NSDAP

In the files, the date of joining the NSDAP is particularly important. Someone who joined before the seizure of power in 1933 was more likely to have been a convinced German Nazi. The party viewed such a person to be an “old fighter.”

If a family member does not appear in the membership files, it does not automatically mean that the person was not involved. About 20 percent of the documents from local registers were lost. Also, not every German with nationalist or antisemitic views automatically joined the party. Sometimes there were long waiting lists, or admissions were suspended. For example, Austrians and Sudeten Germans could not become members until 1938.

Now it is easier to obtain information about the past

To resolve the question of whether ancestors were German Nazis, effort and research may still be required. However, the digitized membership card index at the NARA significantly facilitates the start of the search.

Maria Szonert Binienda

See also:  https://www.dw.com/pl/usa-miliony-akt-nazist%C3%B3w-do-wgl%C4%85du/a-76401572

The post NSDAP membership files on US NARA website appeared first on Polonia Institute.

How the US President is Building His Legacy

According to the liberal media and social media platforms, he has simply gone mad. But even conservative commentators are asking: Does he know what he’s doing? His popularity ratings are low, with 70% of Americans opposing his actions regarding Greenland, and the GOP must prepare to lose control of the House of Representatives. However, there is another explanation: in his second and final term, Trump is thinking more about how he will be remembered by history and less about poll results.

Author: Maciej Kożuszek

“This is my last election. After this, I’ll have more flexibility,” Barack Obama told Dmitry Medvedev on March 26, 2012, assuming the microphones were off. In Poland, this statement is primarily remembered as a symbol of Obama’s “reset” with Russia. However, Obama also expressed an important truth about the American system concerning presidents who are elected for two terms. During the first term, thoughts turn to the second; during the second, thoughts turn to one’s presidential legacy and how to implement one’s political plan as efficiently as possible. Obama’s example shows that “greater flexibility” can have disastrous consequences: the implementation of his plan led to the creation of ISIS in the Middle East and the start of the war in Ukraine. However, Obama’s Nobel Peace Prize remained intact because it had been awarded well in advance…

Apart from Trump’s irrationality, a second diagnosis dominates among commentators: he is not as strong as previously thought. They predict that he will face an internal crisis, lose the midterm elections, see his ratings fall, and be further weakened by competition within his own party for the 2028 presidential nomination. This is a classic example of drawing false conclusions based on true premises. If the midterm elections were held today, it seems certain that the Democrats would take control of the House of Representatives. In the so-called generic ballot — polls measuring voter preferences without dividing them into congressional districts — Democrats enjoy a lead of about 5 percentage points.

In midterm elections, when Americans do not elect a president, voter mobilization is important because turnout is usually lower. Democrats have even more reason to be optimistic here, as they enjoy a 16-point lead among voters who say they are “certain to vote.” The fact that the overall level of trust in Democrats in Congress (28%) is lower than that in Republicans (35%) may be problematic, but only in 2028 when the deeply crisis-stricken party will have to decide whether to follow Zohran Mamdani’s radical leftist path. In House elections, Americans vote in districts. Progressive candidates are put forward in more progressive areas, while more centrist candidates are put forward in the center of America.

But why is the conclusion that Trump is weak false? He himself says that if the Democrats take control of the House, they will attempt to impeach him again. This is true insofar as Trump, like any politician, would prefer to have absolute power. However, sharing power with Congress has its advantages. First, the spectacle of impeachment—which obviously won’t lead to Trump’s removal from the White House—can be a great tool for mobilizing and uniting his supporters. Second, responsibility can be shared by using one of the oldest tricks in American politics.  “I have a great plan, but Congress (or the president, in the Polish context) is making it difficult for me.” Thanks to this trick, Biden shifted all responsibility for delays in supporting Ukraine to Congress, even though the White House was actually responsible for many of them. Even obedient liberals, led by Donald Tusk, criticized the Republicans in the House, not the president. Third, Congress’s tools for stopping the president’s plans are limited, especially in his second term. “I have a pen, and I have a phone,” Barack Obama said in 2014 during his second term when Congress was not cooperating with him. “So, I can sign executive orders, and I can use the weight and importance of my office to convince people of my plans.”

The American system is designed so that the president is elected every four years. During his term, he is granted significant power, making it difficult to remove him from office. This is why midterm elections and polls are important, though they should not be fetishized. Harry Truman, the architect of the postwar system whom everyone is mourning now, holds the record for the lowest approval rating in modern U.S. history. In February 1952, only 22 percent of Americans approved of Truman’s performance. During Ronald Reagan’s eight years as president, Republicans never controlled the House of Representatives. In his last two years, 1987–1989, they also lost control of the Senate. However, history has forgotten these turbulent times in the case of both presidents, focusing instead on the legacy they left behind.

So, the real question is: What legacy does Trump want to leave behind? As a second-term president with a particular character, he has a much greater tolerance for domestic and international turbulence. This must be considered when answering the question: Are the steps taken by the Trump administration rational? The measure here is not the scale of the turmoil and endless episodes of liberal hysteria but whether Trump’s actions serve to implement his plan. Anyone who knows a little history knows that no one has complete control over it and that every plan crumbles when it comes into contact with reality. Moreover, the challenges Trump faces, as well as those facing the US and the West as a whole, are so great that the means used to achieve one goal may prove to be an obstacle to achieving others. For example, Trump would like Europe to clearly stand with the US against China and Russia. However, achieving this goal requires “maximum pressure” to be exerted on Europe. However, Europe, as we clearly saw in Davos, is reluctant to do so.

The paradox of our times is that many people essentially agree with some of Trump’s views. Does Europe have a problem with migration and other issues? Of course. Does Europe need to stop “free riding” when it comes to security? Absolutely! Is it necessary to reduce dependence on rare earth metals in the face of confrontation with China? Yes. Would greater U.S. involvement in Greenland, in terms of both security and economics, increase NATO’s security? Regardless of emotional attitudes, the answer is yes.

The problem is not the diagnoses; the problem is Trump. Europe agrees but would prefer a better atmosphere. However, Trump might respond by drawing on the experience of the Cold War and, above all, the Biden administration. When the atmosphere was good, Europe was satisfied and issued statements about its readiness to meet the challenges of the era. Still, it did nothing.

There is Hope for a European Renewal

The ultimate goal is the spiritual renewal of Europe, as expressed by Vice President Vance in the NSS in Munich and by President Trump in Davos. However, there is a problem with reconciling goals because the pressure Trump puts on Europe puts his potential allies in a difficult position in this renewal effort. This is why several right-wing parties and leaders in the West have distanced themselves from Trump in response to the Greenland crisis. A more realistic operational plan is to break European unity. Contrary to declarations about how united and assertive Europe was on the issue of Greenland, this is already happening. This is illustrated by leaked text messages from Macron proposing a bilateral meeting in Paris while the European Council was establishing a united anti-Trump front. Europe resembles gang members who emphasize “no cooperation” during their get-togethers while selling each other out, figuring on receiving lighter sentences.

Polish politicians, especially those on the right, must participate in this process in a way that considers Poland’s interests. President Nawrocki’s approach to Trump’s Peace Council proposal exemplifies this dilemma. So far, the most advantageous option has been chosen. In view of these choices, two principles must be kept in mind. First, it is the role of Polish politicians, not Trump, to look after our Polish interests. Second, we should take advantage of parts of his plan that align with ours. Breaking up European unity is one of them. If you know your history, you know that the road to greater “European” autonomy, as the view from Paris and Brussels, has always led through Moscow—and today, through Moscow and Beijing.

For the original in Polish, please access: https://niezalezna.pl/swiat/trumpa-randka-z-historia-jak-prezydent-usa-buduje-swoje-dziedzictwo/562686

The post Trump’s rendezvous with history appeared first on Polonia Institute.

Poland is the target of a ‘false flag’ operation

Maciej Świrski

Introduction:  A seemingly domestic dispute, but actually an Active Measures operation

In May 2025, constitutionally mandated presidential elections were held in Poland, resulting in Karol Nawrocki being elected president, according to official and valid results. Although the elections were conducted in accordance with procedures, under the full supervision of the National Electoral Commission (Polish acronym: PKW) and without any significant objections from foreign observers, an unexpected and aggressive campaign to delegitimize the results began just a few days after the results were announced. This was, in fact, a continuation of what had already been happening during the election campaign – systematic undermining of the credibility of the process and discrediting of the main opposition candidate.

Immediately after the announcement of the results of the May presidential election, which, let us recall, were conducted in accordance with the law and did not raise any objections from either the PKW or international observers, increasingly loud accusations began to be made by politicians from the ruling coalition, led by the prime minister. The media and public speakers began to talk about a ‘manipulation,’ ‘systemic advantage,’ ‘election fraud,’ and even the ‘lack of a social mandate’ for the winning candidate.

It is hard not to get the impression that this reaction was not spontaneous, but rather a result of disappointment with the outcome. No new evidence emerged, no effective election protests were lodged, and the elections were not challenged in court. Nevertheless, a narrative offensive was launched, the aim of which was not to clarify any irregularities, but something much more serious: to systematically undermine confidence in the election results and in the office of the president, as such. The tone of these statements was not about correction or repair, but about depriving the president, who had been elected in a general election, of his legitimacy. This was a deliberately sustained message, delivered synchronously across multiple channels and devoid of any constitutional basis.

This is not a mere political conflict. Nor is it a normal political campaign. What we are witnessing has all the hallmarks of an Active Measures operation – disinformation and psychological operations designed to undermine citizens’ trust in the state, challenge the constitutional order, and weaken the structures of sovereignty. This is not about fair debate. It is about eroding the sense of reality and the meaning of collective action. We are under attack on a cognitive level, with a long-term goal of destroying national cohesion by dismantling trust in the fundamental institutions of the state.

The term Active Measures (Russian: Aktivnoye Mieropriyatya) comes from the arsenal of the Soviet KGB and is now used and developed by the Russian FSB and GRU services. It refers to a set of operational activities whose purpose is not to obtain information, as in classic espionage, but rather to actively shape reality in enemy states, especially by sowing chaos, undermining trust in institutions, stirring up social and ethnic conflicts, supporting extreme narratives on both sides of the dispute, and weakening the cohesion of the national community. It is a war without tanks, waged through narratives, emotions, leaks, pseudo-independent analyses, and so-called experts.

Very often, the perpetrators of such scenarios are politicians and journalists who are not agents but who, unknowingly, serve the interests of a foreign state. Their actions are often marked by resentment, ideological blindness or a desire for personal revenge. They can be divided into Class A, i.e., direct operations: sabotage, infiltration, bribery, and Class B, i.e., cognitive operations: disinformation, manipulation of public debate, sowing suspicion, and blurring reality. Poland is currently the target of Class B operations, which aim to destroy trust in elections – the most important mechanism for legitimising power in a democracy.

A false flag operation is a method that has been known for centuries. Its essence is impersonation: the aggressor pretends to be someone else – a victim, a democrat, a defender of freedom. They act ostensibly in the name of principles that they themselves destroy. In modern conflicts, operations of this type involve the services of a foreign state (e.g. Russia) causing chaos in an enemy country through its own citizens. They organise media coverage, construct false narratives, and inspire protests – but they do so in such a way as to make it look like a civil or democratic movement.

A false flag is precisely about deceiving
the public about the source of the actions

‘Defenders of democracy’ are created who, in fact, pursue the goals of the aggressor – they undermine legitimate elections, demand ‘state reform’, suggest the existence of a ‘deep state’ or call for the creation of extraordinary institutions to dismantle the existing order.

Such actions are not only destabilising but also dangerous in terms of the continuity of statehood. In the Polish constitutional system, for example, the president plays a fundamental role: he appoints judges and generals, represents the state internationally, serves as commander-in-chief of the armed forces, and safeguards the continuity of power. Attempting to delegitimise him without legal grounds is not just a constitutional dispute. It is an act that undermines the cohesion of the state as a whole.

In geopolitics, this is one of the most effective ways to weaken a nation’s ability to defend itself. A crisis of confidence in institutions erodes decision-making capacity, paralyses the political system, and paves the way for external intervention, whether legal, media-based, economic, or even military.

Such operations have been tested many times before. In the US in 2020-2021, attempts to delegitimise the presidential election results were partly inspired by Russian and Chinese disinformation, fuelled by both the far right and the far left. In Moldova in 2023, protests were organised against alleged fraud, even though the elections were recognised as legitimate by all international institutions. In Georgia and Ukraine, operations causing social unrest under the banner of ‘defending democracy’ led to deep crises that were exploited by external forces. The same signs appeared everywhere: false defenders of values, emotional moral rhetoric and calls for a ‘reset’ or ‘renewal of the state,’ with foreign services profiting in the background.

In Poland today, we are at the beginning of a similar scenario. This is not a political debate. This is not a normal argument. This is a cognitive war. And the 2025 presidential election is its first, frontal battlefield. We are facing a frontal attack on the foundations of our statehood.

This is why the events surrounding the presidential election today are of fundamental importance, both politically and in terms of the system and civilisation. In a constitutional system, the president is not merely a figurehead. The office embodies the continuity of the state, appoints judges and commanders, represents Poland internationally and upholds the Constitution. Attempting to strip the president of his legitimacy without any legal basis is not just a dispute over a person, but a blow to the very structure of the state. Such action does not remain confined to public debate.

If entrenched, it could lead to a constitutional crisis, which, with favourable media coverage and external pressure, could result in paralysis and, in extreme cases, constitutional chaos. What is today referred to as ‘the question of the rule of law’ may tomorrow become the question of whether Poland still exists as an integrated state entity.

That is why this war is not about elections.
It is about everything.

The Facts: what is happening – a sequence of events

What is unfolding before our eyes today is not a series of random events or the usual dynamics of a political dispute following presidential elections. We are dealing with a methodical sequence of actions which, when analysed as a whole, form a clear vector: the destabilisation of the constitutional order of the Republic of Poland.

The first and most visible element is the public questioning of the legality of Karol Nawrocki’s election as President of the Republic of Poland. Although the elections were held in accordance with constitutional procedures, and their results were confirmed by the National Electoral Commission (PKW) and not effectively challenged in any court, politicians from the ruling coalition launched a frontal campaign to delegitimise them. Accusations of alleged fraud and manipulation have been made, unsupported by any facts or new findings.

The next stage was to shift the focus from the election result itself to the very possibility of the president being sworn in. There was talk that the president could not take office, that a ‘constitutional pause’ or ‘temporary replacement’ by the Speaker of the Sejm was needed.

What is more, suggestions were made to replace the Speaker of the Sejm precisely so that the politician most involved in questioning the legality of Nawrocki’s election could de facto take over the role of the head of state. This is more than just rhetoric – it is an attempt to circumvent the constitutional mechanism through procedural violence, in which the Sejm majority is trying to seize prerogatives for which there is no constitutional basis.

At the same time, a coordinated attack is underway on legally functioning state institutions that remain outside the direct control of the government. Since the beginning of the term in 2023, the following institutions have been targeted: the Institute of National Remembrance (IPN), the National Broadcasting Council (KRRiT), the Constitutional Tribunal (TK) and the National Bank of Poland. It is worth noting that the National Broadcasting Council, the Constitutional Tribunal and the National Bank of Poland are constitutional bodies, and attacking them – undermining their existence, demanding ‘new compositions’ and refusing to respect their decisions – already bears the hallmarks of a constitutional coup. The IPN, although not mentioned in the constitution, is one of the last bastions of historical policy based on sovereignty and is therefore a target of disintegration efforts.

The fourth, extremely important thread, is the operation being carried out at the international level, with the participation of politicians from the ruling coalition. It consists of the systematic delegitimisation of Poland in European Union institutions through passivity, feigned diplomacy, and the deliberate avoidance of a firm defence of the national interest at a time when Europe is going through its greatest geopolitical crisis since the Second World War.

There is a war going on in Ukraine, Israel is striking Iran, Germany is intensifying its pressure for federalisation, and many EU member states are seeking strategic separation from the United States. At this very moment, Poland, as a NATO and EU border state, should be active, assertive, united and clear. Instead, we are faced with deliberate sluggishness, a lack of vision and external consent to gradually strip us of our sovereignty. Part of this process is taking place with the full consent or even cooperation of those in power, which is one of the most dangerous manifestations of this operation.

Finally, all of this takes place with full media synchronisation. At the same time, the topics of ‘illegal elections’, ‘fraud’ and ‘an unrecognised president’ appear in several major newsrooms. This message is not the result of natural development; it is more akin to orchestration, with identical vocabulary, emotional gradation and convergence of arguments and sources. In the context of cognitive warfare, this effect – a massive media onslaught designed to replace facts with emotions – constitutes the fundamental tool of modern influence operations.

This sequence — from undermining the election and attacking the inauguration to assaulting constitutional institutions, displaying international passivity, and synchronising the media — forms a coherent operation whose logic extends far beyond politics. It is an attack on the very essence of statehood.

Analysis: Features of Active Measures operations
– a textbook example

Observing the current political situation in Poland, it is difficult not to notice that we are dealing with an operation with an almost textbook structure and dynamics when it comes to Active Measures. In the classic Soviet approach – continued and developed today by the Russian FSB and GRU — such an operation does not consist of a single spectacular act of sabotage, but of long-term, coordinated and blurred cognitive action, the aim of which is not to convince anyone of a specific version of reality, but to undermine trust in any version of reality at all.

The first and most characteristic element of this operation is controlled disinformation. We are not dealing with blatant lies – on the contrary, what dominates are ‘questions’, insinuations, suggestions, rhetorical phrases such as ‘can we be sure?’, ‘was everything fair?’, ‘has the system been manipulated?’ This technique does not require evidence – all that is needed is to spread uncertainty. Journalists express ‘concern’, citizens ask ‘questions’, experts raise ‘doubts’ – all based on carefully measured language of understatement. As a result, it is not specific claims but the very atmosphere of suspicion that begins to dominate the public debate.

The second feature of the operation is cognitive warfare, which is not about determining who is right, but rather about destroying society’s ability to accept any argument as valid. Rather than pointing fingers, the aim is to ensure that nobody trusts the election results, that everyone doubts the fairness of the process and that the concept of ‘president’ becomes controversial.

Rather than attacking facts, this operation attacks trust itself as a social category. Consequently, there is no longer any common ground on which to agree, because ‘everyone has their own version’ and ‘no one knows what really happened’. In such an atmosphere, the state becomes ungovernable.

Another element is reversed axiology, whereby legal and constitutional actions are presented as allegedly undemocratic. In this mechanism, the executive or parliamentary authority attempts to strip the head of state of their legitimacy, despite them being elected in accordance with the law and with full transparency of procedures. The normal functioning of constitutional bodies, such as the Constitutional Tribunal, the National Bank of Poland and the National Broadcasting Council, is presented as a ‘threat to democracy’. This inverted language causes the public to confuse order with chaos and reform with abuse. In a climate of social fatigue and cognitive overload, it is easy to blur the boundaries of the rule of law under the guise of defending it.

Another important aspect of the operation is its multi-channel nature. Actions are not limited to a single medium or institution. Journalists, activists, politicians, ‘experts’, non-governmental organisations and, most importantly, external channels such as European Union institutions, foreign think tanks, and embassies all work in parallel. This creates a multi-voice effect that gives the illusion of widespread belief that ‘something is going on.’

In reality, this is the result of operational synchronisation, which is characteristic of mature forms of Active Measures. In classic warfare, actions are carried out on the front line. In cognitive warfare, the front line is the entire information reality – and everything that can shape beliefs.

Finally, and perhaps most dangerously, the vector is not indigenous.

All of these actions fit perfectly
into the geostrategic interests of
the Russian Federation and, indirectly, Germany.

From Moscow’s perspective, this operation is a tool for dismantling the statehood of a NATO country located on the eastern front, whose stability threatens plans to rebuild the sphere of influence. From Berlin’s perspective, the current turmoil serves to implement a model of federalisation of the European Union, in which Poland is symbolically disarmed and becomes a ‘contextual state’ – functioning only as an EU subsystem, rather than as an entity capable of opposition. In this sense, the Active Measures operation currently underway in Poland is not an experiment. It is part of a long-term strategy to break up Central Europe as the axis of resistance on the continent.

When we realise that each of the components described above was launched almost simultaneously – undermining the election results, attempts to block the swearing-in ceremony, attacks on constitutional institutions, international delegitimisation, a massive media campaign – it is difficult to talk about ordinary politics. This is no longer a dispute over power. These are actions recognisable in the operational history of Soviet and post-Soviet services. And unfortunately, Poland is once again becoming a battlefield where the goal is not to take over the government, but to destroy the very possibility of governing.

The logic of false flag– a war masquerading as democracy

One of the most disturbing aspects of the current events in Poland is their consistency with the classic pattern of false flag operations, i.e. actions carried out by one centre but disguised as another in order to confuse the observer, shift responsibility and create a narrative that disarms the victim before they even realise they are the target of an attack.

In this case, we are dealing with an operation carried out by people and political circles who present themselves as defenders of democracy, the rule of law and freedom, but whose actions, in terms of content, form, and effect – fit perfectly into the logic of cognitive aggression used by Russia for decades. This is no longer even inspiration – it is an operational blueprint.

The current sequence of events in Poland is inspired by recent precedents in other countries. For example, in the United States, after the 2020–21 presidential election, there was a violent campaign to question the result, stir up emotions, and divide society. This campaign was largely fuelled by troll farms in St Petersburg and Beijing. Russian cognitive operations actively promoted both right-wing and extremely progressive narratives to cause maximum emotional chaos and a loss of common ground.

In Ukraine in 2013-2014 and in Georgia, several attempts were made to undermine democratic processes in this way, portraying legally elected authorities as undemocratic, Western-controlled, corrupt, or illegal. In each of these cases, the mechanics were similar: a seemingly grassroots civil movement, radical moral language, the use of social media and local opinion leaders, and the complete alignment of actions with Moscow’s strategic goals.

In Poland, the same method has been used for years in a narrative in which the destruction of state institutions is presented as a ‘fight for freedom’ – which, as we remember, has been the case since the beginning of the PiS government.

Attempts to prevent the swearing-in of a legally elected president are supposedly a ‘defence of democracy’. Undermining the competence and legality of constitutional bodies – such as the National Broadcasting Council, the Constitutional Tribunal and the National Bank of Poland – is presented as ‘systemic reform’ and ‘restoring order’.

In fact, we are witnessing the opposite process: the dismantling of the constitutional pillars of the state under the guise of a fight for democracy. This is a classic strategy of reverse legitimacy – actions aimed at depriving the opponent of moral and legal legitimacy, regardless of facts and procedures. All this is being carried out by circles which, in the eyes of the public, present themselves as ‘democratic’, ‘pro-European’ or ‘progressive’.

This is what makes this operation a classic false flag: actions are carried out in the name of Western values, but the result is the breakdown of state structures, institutional chaos, international isolation and deep fragmentation of the national community – exactly what Moscow has wanted for thirty years.

A false flag does not work through force, but through authority. When those perceived as defenders of democracy carry out a scenario of weakening the state, society loses the ability to recognise who is really acting in its own interests and who is merely a tool in someone else’s game.

A false flag is therefore not just a tactic – it is a profound distortion of the symbolic space, in which aggression is called defence and the decay of institutions is called reform.

In this way, war no longer looks like war, and the victim begins to feel ashamed of their own defence. This is why cognitive operations are so difficult to recognise: they do not come in uniforms, but in suits; not with weapons, but with microphones; not under a red banner, but under a blue flag with yellow stars.

What is happening today in Poland is not fundamentally different from the operations previously carried out in the countries of Georgia, Moldova or the United States. Only the language and scenery change – the logic remains the same: disarm the state with its own language, question the legitimacy of its institutions with the help of its own citizens, and bring about a moment when no one knows who is telling the truth – and thus the truth ceases to matter. In such a cognitive vacuum, there is no need for tanks or missiles – all that is needed is well-designed chaos.

Organised networks of information diversion also play an extremely important role in this false flag operation, whose aim is not to convince anyone, but to blow up social cohesion from within. One of the most visible examples in Poland is the group operating under the slogan ‘Silni Razem’ (‘Strong Together’) – a group of seemingly spontaneous social media users who in reality act as a digital ideological militia tasked with attacking, discrediting and psychologically suppressing anyone who expresses views other than those accepted by the liberal-progressive mainstream. Such networks are not a civil movement in the classic sense. They operate using mechanisms familiar from information warfare: mass reproduction of messages, the use of memes as emotional weapons, personal harassment of opponents, and mass reporting of content hostile to their narrative to social media administrators. Members of these networks are often not professional trolls, but their behaviour is the product of deep cognitive indoctrination, reminiscent of the methods used by sects. A black-and-white language prevails, with no room for doubt, questions or nuance. Anyone who disagrees with the line is an enemy. And the enemy has no right to be in the public sphere. The enemy has no right to exist.

From a psychological point of view, ‘Strong Together’ is an example of a modern form of social cognitive automatism – a mechanism in which people do not interpret reality, but react to a set of learned signals, slogans and symbols. These are not active participants in the debate – they are terminals of a self-perpetuating programme. Their main function is not to convince neutral audiences, but to poison the debate so that no one wants to speak up.

Chilling effect, self-censorship, silence – these are the most valuable resources for information operations. Such networks – although presented as grassroots, spontaneous and ‘progressive’ – perform exactly the same function as organised diversionary groups that used to break up states from within in the past. They do not wear uniforms, but they have avatars. They do not use dynamite, but mass reporting to social media administrators about the ‘hate speech’ allegedly used by their opponents. Their weapon is not argument, but mockery, defamation and harassment. For the average internet user, encountering this machine means only one thing: the fear of speaking out. Where people are afraid to speak, the truth is the first casualty.

In this sense, networks such as ‘Silni Razem’ are a tool of third-generation cognitive aggression, not physical or informational, but identity-based. Their existence not only poisons the debate. They reconfigure concepts:

patriotism becomes ‘fascism’, sovereignty becomes ‘isolationism’, the constitution becomes ‘an obstacle to reform’

And that is precisely why they are becoming an informal infrastructure for false flag operations, disguised as ‘social opposition’ but in reality pursuing the logic of cognitive dismantling of the state by the decision-making centre of the entire operation – Moscow.

The strategic goals of Russia and Germany

To understand the deeper meaning of the operation to destabilise Poland, it is not enough to look at it solely through the prism of internal political struggle. It must be placed in a broader geopolitical context – as an instrument in the hands of two powers which, although seemingly antagonistic, are today working in parallel to weaken Poland as a sovereign political entity.

Russia and Germany, each for its own reasons, see Poland as an obstacle to the realisation of their long-term interests.

A strong, stable Poland, rooted in national consciousness and strategically anchored in an alliance with the US, is a problem for both neo-imperial Moscow and federalist Berlin. Therefore, the goal is no longer just to change the government or win the media narrative. The goal is something deeper: to dismantle the structure of Poland’s statehood.

From Russia’s point of view, the operation to destabilise Poland internally is part of a long-standing strategy to dismantle NATO’s security architecture on its eastern flank. Poland is the most important frontline state of the Alliance – in terms of population, geography, military and logistics. It is also a country connecting the Three Seas region – a project aimed at making Central Europe independent from the influence of Moscow and Berlin. For this reason, undermining Poland’s credibility – through constitutional chaos, questioning the legitimacy of the authorities and paralysing institutions – is becoming a key tool for disarming NATO without firing a single shot. If Poland is shown to be incapable of maintaining constitutional order, its voice in NATO will become less audible and its allies’ willingness to cooperate will be significantly reduced.

Russia is also seeking to disintegrate the Three Seas Initiative, seeing it as a threat to its plans to rebuild its sphere of influence. If Poland is discredited as a regional leader – through institutional crisis, military weakness and chaotic foreign policy – the Three Seas Initiative will collapse. Countries such as Romania, the Czech Republic and the Baltic states will be forced to look for other points of reference, and then pressure from Berlin and pragmatism towards Moscow will naturally emerge. In addition, the constitutional chaos in Poland is a tool for Russia to break down Polish national identity – the same identity that has been an obstacle to imperial projects in the region for centuries. A country that does not know who its legitimate president is, that undermines its own institutions and where patriotism is presented as a threat to democracy – such a country ceases to be an opponent. It becomes an open field to be conquered.

Germany, on the other hand, although it does not conduct hybrid activities with such an overt structure as Russia, is pursuing its goal methodically, through the institutional and axiological instruments of the European Union.

Berlin’s main goal is to regain its position as a metastate in Central Europe – not through tanks, but through treaties, regulations, legal control mechanisms and axiological pressure.

The key tool here is the European Union, whose institutions are increasingly being used as a mechanism to discipline member states rather than as a platform for equal partners. The revitalisation of Germany’s legal and ideological dominance is taking place through a system of pressure on the courts, the media, the energy sector, education and public finances. If Poland is forced to ‘repair its relations with the EU’ as a result of internal chaos, this will effectively mean accepting an externally imposed model of governance.

Berlin is primarily concerned about Poland’s energy independence, which is disrupting German plans to make the region dependent on gas and ‘green industry’ technologies controlled by German corporations. The Germans are also irritated by Poland’s historical policy, which reminds them of Germany’s responsibility for World War II, Yalta and the post-war erasure of Central Europe’s sovereignty. Revenge for independence – energy, symbolic and strategic – is not a figure of speech. It is Berlin’s policy pursued under the banner of ‘the rule of law’, ‘European values’ and ‘restoring trust’.

As a result, both countries – Russia and Germany – although acting with different methods and from different directions, currently have a common interest: to weaken Poland as a sovereign, culturally rooted and independent player. Russia wants chaos. Germany wants subordination.

Their goals are not mutually exclusive – they complement each other. And Poland, if it fails to understand this logic, will become a space devoid of decision-making capacity – both towards the East and the West. This is precisely why the operation to undermine the presidential election is not merely a domestic conflict. It is a key arena of 21st-century geopolitical competition in Central Europe.

In this context, one more key strategic goal of Germany should be added: the final invalidation and silencing of Polish demands for reparations for World War II. The issue of reparations, which has been consistently raised by the Polish authorities in recent years, not only reminds the world of Germany’s unresolved responsibility for crimes, destruction and occupation, but also poses a real threat to Berlin’s axiological hegemony within the European Union. In the eyes of the German political class, any recognition of Polish claims – even symbolic – would open a Pandora’s box that could call into question the foundations of Germany’s post-war ‘moral leadership’ in Europe.

Therefore, weakening Poland as a sovereign state, and especially as an entity capable of making historical claims, is a goal for Berlin that is not only political but existential. In a scenario of constitutional chaos, in which the legitimacy of the Polish authorities is questioned, any demand for reparations can be presented as ‘unrepresentative’, ‘discredited’ or ‘irresponsible’ – and, as a result, permanently invalidated on the international stage. Thus, the operation to delegitimise the Polish state serves not only to change the balance of power in Europe, but also to erase once and for all Germany’s uncomfortable reckoning with history.

From Berlin’s perspective, this would be a double triumph: firstly, a return to its role as the unquestioned decision-making centre of the EU, and secondly, the final silencing of an issue that could undermine the foundations of the post-WW2 political order, based on the silence surrounding the suffering of the peoples of Central Europe. Poland, confused, internally divided and internationally marginalised, will not be able to act as a voice demanding historical justice. And this, from the point of view of German raison d’état, is a strategic value of the highest order.

The issue of reparations is particularly important for Berlin right now because the newly elected Polish president, Karol Nawrocki, clearly and unequivocally declared during his election campaign that extracting reparations from Germany for World War II would be an important part of his presidential agenda. He pointed out that Poland, as a victim of the greatest armed conflict of the 20th century, can no longer remain silent about the fact that no serious compensation has ever been paid for the extermination of its citizens or for the destruction of its state, culture and infrastructure.

This announcement struck at the very heart of the German strategy of silence and delegitimisation of the issue of reparations. That is why, already during the election campaign, Karol Nawrocki became the target of an unprecedented wave of media and political attacks based on insinuations, half-truths and emotional demonisation. Even then, it was clear that the media narrative largely resonated with Berlin’s interests, and some journalists and politicians – personally, financially or ideologically linked to German institutions – began to openly question not only his views but also his right to hold the highest office in the state.

The current operation to delegitimise Karol Nawrocki’s election and prevent him from taking office is therefore a natural extension of this strategy. Moreover, these actions are supported by politicians, including the prime minister himself, who have been associated for years with German influence structures, think tanks and transnational organisations whose interest is not in a strong and independent Poland, but in a predictable, submissive and ‘Europeanised’ country.

These facts clearly show that the struggle to prevent a legally elected president from taking office has a specific German national interest behind it. It is not only about defending their historical narrative, but also about blocking the process of inter-state reckoning, which, given the precedent, could have a domino effect across Europe. Germany cannot afford this. That is why it is doing everything in its power to ensure that Poland, before it can demand justice, ceases to be treated as a country capable of articulating its own claims. The operation to delegitimise President Nawrocki is therefore a strategic protective mechanism for Berlin, carried out by others but very much in its own interest.

Escalation scenarios

If the current operation to delegitimise the legally elected President Karol Nawrocki is not stopped – either by state institutions or by public opinion – we must expect another phase of escalation, which could lead to a real breakdown of the constitutional order in Poland. Observing the logic of previous Active Measures operations in Central and Eastern Europe, as well as analysing internal political and media tensions, we can identify at least three possible – and simultaneously developing – scenarios for destabilisation.

Firstly: institutional escalation. After President Nawrocki is sworn in, we can expect attempts to invalidate his decisions ex post, especially regarding the appointment of judges, armed forces commanders and ambassadors. This will be achieved through Sejm resolutions, rulings by ‘alternative’ judicial structures, and referrals to international tribunals and EU bodies. The aim of such an operation will not be legal effectiveness – as its chances of success are slim – but to create interpretative chaos in which some institutions cease to recognise the decisions of others.

In such an environment, the concept of ‘legality’ disappears and the state becomes paralysed. This is a well-known technique for dismantling institutions, previously used, among other states,  in Moldova and Ukraine in 2005-2007. To some extent, this has been happening since the beginning of the term of office at the end of 2023 – examples include the illegal takeover of public media and the illegal appointment of an acting Deputy Prosecutor General.

Secondly: the use of the idea of election fraud as an emotional and axiological figure for the consolidation of the liberal-left camp. Just as the Smoleńsk disaster was a symbolic axis of mobilisation and memory for the patriotic side, so the ‘rigged elections of 2025’ could become a founding myth for the coalition circles, around which a political identity, a language of moral superiority and legitimacy for extraordinary measures are being built. In this view, President Nawrocki is not an opponent – he is a ‘product of fraud’, and therefore the rules of standard political play do not apply to him. This way of thinking can lead to the justification of unconstitutional actions, because a ‘higher truth’ demands extraordinary measures. This is dangerous because it blurs the lines between politics and staged rebellion. In the background, Russia’s kinetic actions against the main actors of the Polish patriotic milieu may be lurking, less visible in the fog of confusion caused by this turmoil.

Thirdly: the collapse of constitutional order and the emergence of parallel structures. As legal chaos grows, we can expect to see the re-emergence of so-called democracy defence committees – this time not as a protest movement, but as quasi-political and constitutional bodies that will begin to announce ‘alternative social verdicts, appoint ‘shadow presidents’ or organise ‘social tribunals’. This type of action has been tested before in Latin America, the Caucasus and Central Asia, always with the same result: the destruction of the authority of state institutions and the shift of the centre of decision-making to extra-legal structures.

In the Polish context, this would mean an attempt to install a political dual power: on the one hand, a legal president, and on the other, an informal but media and internationally-supported structure of ‘civil representation’. This would result in executive paralysis and deep social disorientation, which could be used as a pretext for further intervention by EU institutions – no longer in the form of dialogue, but of crisis management.

All three scenarios are not hypothetical – their elements are already appearing in the public, media and political sphere. Their full activation is merely an operational decision, either internal or external. In such a scenario, the state ceases to be the guarantor of order, instead becoming a field of competing narratives about legality, truth, and sovereignty. This is not a political difference of opinion. This is a systemic dismantling of statehood – carried out with kid gloves, but with the precision of a surgical knife cut.

Final diagnosis: Poland as a target of cognitive warfare

What we are seeing today in Poland – from the questioning of the legitimacy of the presidential elections, through the destabilisation of constitutional institutions, to the creation of parallel media and political narratives – is not a mere parliamentary crisis. This is not a dispute between parties, programmatic differences or controversial legislative decisions. We are dealing with a classic hybrid operation, conducted at the cognitive, institutional and symbolic levels, whose goal is not to gain power, but to invalidate the very meaning of state structures.

The cognitive war being waged against Poland today does not come dressed in uniform, nor is it announced in parliament or called a war campaign. Its aim is to destroy citizens’ ability to interpret political reality together. If we no longer know who has been legally elected, whom to trust, what is fact and what is narrative, then the basic code of social trust — without which no democratic order can be maintained — breaks down. This is the essence of cognitive warfare: disintegrating the space of meaning so that sovereignty can no longer be exercised effectively.

In this model, it is not about replacing one party with another or replacing the president with a more ‘European’ one. It is about something much deeper: it is about Poland ceasing to be perceived – and ceasing to perceive itself – as a sovereign state capable of acting independently within its own constitutional order. What is at stake in this operation is not the government, but the very identity of Poland. If the elections can be delegitimised, the functions of institutions blurred and the belief that everything is relative and nothing matters entrenched, then there will be no need to conquer territory. It will be enough for Poland to become a space without structure – a political body without a bone structure.

This is the direction taken by a concept which, although it has not been formally announced anywhere, is the informal goal of many European and Russian circles at the same time: to transform Poland into a ‘contextual state’. This means a country that does not exist as an independent strategic actor, but only as a function of larger structures – the EU, NATO, the Western energy market or the German industrial system.

The contextual state does not make decisions – it ‘reacts’ to reality. It does not shape relationships – it only “implements” them. It has no mission – it has a schedule of directives.

In such a model, strong constitutional institutions are unnecessary, a strong president is unnecessary, and a sovereign nation is unnecessary. All that is needed is an executive class, well synchronised with the interests of foreign and media centres, which maintains the appearance of democratic processes while in fact translating instructions into national regulations. Poland as a state ceases to be a subject. It becomes an environment. A functional territory.

And that is precisely why the operation to delegitimise the 2025 elections is not just another chapter in a political dispute. It is a decisive test of whether Poland will retain its ability to be a state in the classical sense – with a legitimate centre of power, functional institutions and a community capable of self-organisation – or whether it will undergo a process of decomposition that has already affected many peripheral countries. This test is ongoing. Everything indicates that we will not pass it unless we understand that we are the target of a war, even though no shots are being fired. This is a war for meaning. For legality. For memory. For existence.

Conclusion: building an epistemic shield

In the face of the cognitive warfare being waged against Poland — which aims to delegitimise the president and destroy the state’s capacity for self-determination — it is necessary to establish a new approach to national defence.

An army, missile systems and even advanced cybersecurity technologies are no longer enough. The threat has not come from across the border, but from perception. In this sense, cognition is becoming a new battlefield, and the protection of the state’s epistemic infrastructure a new strategic imperative.

Therefore, Poland must urgently begin the process of building an epistemic defence shield – a set of tools, structures and strategies aimed at recognising, neutralising and pre-empting cognitive and narrative operations of hostile origin. A key element of this strategy should be the establishment of a National Centre for Cognitive Operations Recognition (CROP) – an institution operating at the intersection of intelligence analysis, semiotics, social psychology and state security. The CROP would be tasked with monitoring the public space for the presence of Active Measures vectors, identifying disinformation matrices and locating channels of propagation (from troll networks to international centres of influence).

The second pillar of this new doctrine should be the development of a national cognitive resilience system, i.e. a network of educational and strategic institutions that teach how to recognise manipulation, decode persuasive techniques and understand the language of psychological operations. Such programmes should operate not only at the level of decision-making elites, but also in higher education, public media, and training for the administration and the military. The ability of society to recognise cognitive operations must become an element of Polish national security.

The third – and perhaps most important – step is to fully recognise the cognitive domain as equivalent to the military and cyber domains. This means the need to create a strategic doctrine of cognitive defence, whose goal will not be censorship, but building resilience, strengthening social cohesion and protecting the state’s ability to articulate its own narrative. In this doctrine, an attack on an institution through false narratives is tantamount to an attack on critical infrastructure, and its neutralisation should be treated with the same priority as defence against a missile attack.

However, it should be clearly stated that none of these reforms will be possible as long as those who participate in the destruction of the constitutional order remain in power. The current political elites from the ruling coalition, who themselves are engaged in activities that undermine the foundations of sovereignty, delegitimise elections, attack constitutional institutions and support cognitive operations of hostile origin, are not only incapable of building such a shield, but also constitute its main threat. Their exercise of power today is a real risk to the existence of the Republic of Poland as a state.

Therefore, the first step towards rebuilding cognitive security is to remove these people from power in a manner consistent with the constitution, but decisive and irreversible. Only then can we begin to build a new, sovereign cognitive immunity system that will not only protect Poland from Active Measures operations, but also make it the subject of its own narrative, rather than its passive recipient. Without this, Poland will remain a state that knows its territorial borders but loses control over the borders of consciousness.

And this is precisely the goal of every cognitive war: to conquer a country not by force, but by destroying its meaning.

This text was originally published in Polish here:

https://wpolityce.pl/polityka/733158-wojna-o-legalnosc-polska-jako-cel-operacji-false-flag

The post Poland is the target of a ‘false flag’ operation appeared first on Polonia Institute.

Good news for conservatives from Poland’s presidential election

Conservative Karol Nawrocki won the second round of the Polish presidential election conducted this weekend.

The margin was narrow, with about 300,000+ votes separating ten million on each side.

When voting stations closed, preliminary exit polls suggested the Left might win, but as the night wore on, Rafal Trzaskowski’s supposed lead evaporated.

(This, in contrast to some American states – like California and Arizona — Poland’s electoral commission seems to have tallied almost all votes cast overnight.  “How many Americans does it take to count ballots?”)

Nawrocki’s election continues the winning global run of conservative leaders intent on protecting their national identities, borders, and values.

By contrast, leftist Trzaskowski promised abortion, homosexual marriage, support for some of the heavy-handed measures of the current Tusk government against the opposition, and subservience to the EU.

In the U.S., House Foreign Affairs Committee Chairman Brian Mast wrote a letter last week criticizing EU and Soros interference on Trzaskowski’s behalf in the campaign leading up to the second round of Polish presidential elections.

A Nawrocki presidency will lead to a split government in Poland, the relatively powerful presidency in conservative hands holding the left-leaning Prime Minister Donald Tusk – a Europhile – in check.

That’s important, because since coming to power Dec. 13, 2023 (a telling date, the anniversary Wojciech Jaruzelski declared martial law on his own country in 1981), Tusk has carried on heavy-handed attacks against the former conservative “Law and Justice” government, which ruled Poland from 2016-23.

Tusk justified his purges of media officials, his charges against former government officials, and his ignoring the Constitutional Tribunal by claiming that he was defending democracy against the supposedly authoritarian former government and so needed to conduct a “reckoning” (rozliczenie) against its predecessor.

The term rozliczenie is interesting, because while the Tusk government defended its tactics against a government freely elected twice (2015, 2019) and which also took the Polish presidency in 2020.

By contrast, whenever Polish conservatives – including the former Law and Justice government – sought a “reckoning” with the history of postwar communism in Poland, pressing to “open the files” to make public who was in bed with whom, most of Tusk’s “Civic Platform” party members fought against such public accountability.

Nawrocki will, therefore, check the worst leftist inclinations of Tusk, his party, and his allies through presidential vetoes and the presidential bully pulpit.  It also puts him in a position potentially to accelerate parliamentary elections.

In the runup to this weekend’s vote, the Polish left pulled out many tropes familiar to Americans: that Nawrocki had to be defeated to “protect Polish democracy,” that this was a choice between a “xenophobic, nationalist Poland versus a Poland with a European horizon,” that the work of “reckoning” with the former government and the promises of the Tusk government would be impeded by Nawrocki (as they had by the incumbent retiring conservative president, Andrzej Duda), and that Poland had to decide between “Catholic” versus “inclusive” values.

With the close election over and Poland’s electoral map somewhat split like in the United States, the Left is now warning against “polarization” and calling for “building bridges,” a need they never identified during the past 18 months of the Tusk government.

Because there is a strong bipartisan consensus in Poland about the importance of good relations with the United States as well as for mutual burden-sharing (Poland has for years met or exceeded NATO contribution levels), Warsaw’s relations with Washington will likely remain strong.  Nawrocki will likely be a serious interlocutor with the Trump administration.

At the same time, Nawrocki will also be a likely check on the Tusk government’s drift towards Brussels and Germany.

Domestic politics are likely, however, to be rockier, as the Tusk government’s ability to pursue its left agenda will be subject to presidential veto.  Whether that results in Tusk rebalancing his positions, hoping by appearing more “centrist” to cultivate a “moderate” image, or in staking out his territory on the left through symbolic (losing) votes in Parliament remains to be seen.

John M. Grondelski

This article was first published in the American Thinker here: Good news for conservatives from Poland’s presidential election

The post Dr Karol Nawrocki, a conservatist, wins presidential elections in Poland appeared first on Polonia Institute.

Donald Tusk, Prime Minister of Poland,

Adam Bodnar, Minister of Justice, Poland

April 10, 2025

We protest with the utmost indignation and determination against the unprecedented and illegal attempt on April 9, 2025, by the Provincial Administrative Court in Warsaw and announced by Judge Barbara Kołodziejczak-Osetek, to revoke the broadcasting licenses granted to Republika Television and Television in Poland 24 in accordance with applicable law by the National Broadcasting Council.

We believe that this decision, formally taken in the first instance, is part of an increasingly visible, disturbing, and unacceptable tendency to instrumentalize the judiciary and state administration to fight independent media and suppress voices critical of the current government, which is particularly outrageous during the ongoing presidential campaign.

The attempt to silence free media – independent, often inconvenient for those in power, but acting in accordance with the law and in the interest of citizens – is a clear violation of democratic values ​​that constitute the foundation of both the Republic of Poland and the international community of which Poland is a part.

We appeal to the Prime Minister and the Minister of Justice to:

• immediately condemn this act of abuse of judicial power,
• ensure full constitutional protection of freedom of speech and media freedom in Poland, and
• bring consequences to people who openly act to harm the legal order and Poland’s image in the international arena.

Poland belongs to its citizens – both those in the country and abroad. We Poles scattered around the world will not remain passive in the face of illegal actions that threaten Poles’ freedom, democracy, and media independence.

There is no consent to gag the free media!
There is no consent to lawlessness under the guise of law!

Kind regards,

Polonia Institute

The post Violation of free speech in Poland appeared first on Polonia Institute.

Someone made a terrible mistake in choosing the guests. Instead of the usual platitudes, the writer Marko Martin devoted most of his speech not to the fall of the wall, but to solidarity and the slogan ‘For our freedom and yours’. He presented the Poles as a model of resistance against the background of the German passivity under communism. He demanded that our role be recognized and that we get away from the legend of ‘Gorbie’. And at the end, he scolded the host for prostituting himself with Putin, to the point where Steinmeier is said to have lost his temper. Today, the transcript of the speech has been hidden on the official channel.

Extensive extracts from the speech:

Dear Federal President, Ladies and Gentlemen – but above all, our distinguished Polish guests, including the heroes of the Solidarity revolution and the co-initiators of the Gdansk shipyard strike: without your courage, there would have been no “1989”. As you have obviously not been invited to the all-German panel that will follow today, I would like to say thank you, (in Polish) Thank you very much! (..)

He goes on to contrast and criticize the passivity of people in the GDR at the end of communism with today’s support for the AfD and Wagenknecht.

In Ukraine today, the question is whether 1989 really marked the beginning of a lasting history of freedom, or whether it was just a pause in world history. And yet it seems that too many people in both East and West Germany lack the insight and the will to recognize this fact – and to act accordingly. But was it any different before – in the 1980s and in relation to Poland, where almost the entire population actually rose up against the dictatorship with enormous courage?

Although the Polish resistance was inspiring to GDR civil rights activists, a very different view was heard among much of the population. Why, it was said at the time, not just half-heartedly, did the ‘Poles’ simply not go to work, instead of going on strike, constantly demanding freedom and upsetting ‘us’?

The writer then moved on to West Germany:

‘In 1982, for example, Egon Bahr (SLD politician, father of Ostpolitik) described Solidarity in the magazine Vorwärts as “a threat to world peace”. A disgrace that the poet Peter Rühmkorf, still widely revered today as a subversive intellectual, affirmed in the stern tone of the Nazi fathers’ generation: ‘No one in the world can impose anything more than work and discipline on the Polish people – but who has the courage to actually impose them?’

‘But what does this have to do with the 35th anniversary of the Peaceful Revolution in the GDR? Certainly, more than we would like. This distorted concept of peace, which asks no questions about permanence, stability, and justice, now flies back and forth between East and West like a weaving shuttle. And with my hand on my heart: is it really recognized in the collective memory that the first stone of the Berlin Wall was once cut off at the Lenin Shipyard in Danzig?

I think it says a lot about the German lack of historical awareness – both in the East and in the West – that all this is deliberately suppressed and instead continues to wallow in nostalgic memories of the ‘good Tsar Gorbie’, under whose rule the Kremlin did not send in tanks or shoot civilians. Only that on ‘Bloody Sunday in Vilnius’ on 13 January 1991, it did.

‘For our freedom and your freedom’ has been a Polish slogan since the 19th century, understood by civil rights activists in the GDR, by people in Eastern Europe in 1989, and later in 2004 and 2014 during the democratic revolutions in Kyiv. Meanwhile, it seems that the contempt masked as Realpolitik, which used to speak the words of Egon Bahr, still has influence in Germany.’

Finally, Martin leaves himself to plow on with his main listener, Steinmeier:

‘Gerhard Schröder, still the unpunished, boastful friend of the mass murderer in the Kremlin (and Steinmeier’s patron saint, my addition) is now assured by the new SPD general secretary that there will be a place for him in German Social Democracy. This, incidentally, sounds just as appalling as the words uttered in 2016 by the then foreign minister (Steinmeier!) that NATO maneuvers on the eastern flank to protect the democracies there were ‘saber waving and warmongering’.

Warmongering!

‘Dear Federal President, with all due respect: the Nord Stream project, which the SPD and the CDU clung to for so pitifully long against all legitimate criticism, was only a ‘bridge’ – Your words from spring 2022 – insofar as it further encouraged Putin’s aggression, namely the calculation that Germany, otherwise world champions of moralizing, would not let go of the lucrative deal, regardless of Ukraine. And again, with no small amount of arrogance, the clear warnings in Eastern Europe were ignored. And it is the threatened Eastern Europe that will have to suffer the consequences.’

The post 35th anniversary of the fall of the Berlin Wall appeared first on Polonia Institute.

https://www.facebook.com/maryqueenshrine/posts/an-inside-look-on-entering-the-church-you-see-a-strikingly-original-holy-water-f/3104492899617254/

Continued big spending at US Bases in Poland

https://www.stripes.com/branches/army/2024-10-22/poland-american-military-base-spending-15588987.html

Donald Tusk’s gov’t. continuing the push for EU enlargement
https://www.reuters.com/world/europe/eu-enlargement-key-focus-polands-presidency-bloc-says-tusk-2024-10-24/

No Polish voice at the Berlin summit

https://www.warsawvoice.pl/WVpage/pages/article.php/61102/news

US approves sale of F-16 Viper upgrade to Poland

The F-16 Viper modernisation effort will enhance Poland’s air defence and surveillance capabilities.

https://www.airforce-technology.com/news/us-f-16-viper-midlife-upgrade-poland/

Warsaw’s Museum of Modern Art opens its doors

https://www.polskieradio.pl/395/7791/Artykul/3439741

Janusz Olejniczak, who played the piano parts in Oscar-winning movie ‘The Pianist,’ dies at 72

https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/2024/10/21/poland-pianist-olejniczak-chopin-obit/e7006eec-8f9b-11ef-b5b1-75167840d9f3_story.html

Remembering Janusz Olejniczak – a profound loss for Polish culture

https://www.polskieradio.pl/395/7791/Artykul/3437767

Bipartisan House members push Biden to allow Poland to shoot down Russian missiles over Ukraine

https://thehill.com/homenews/house/4960374-biden-poland-air-defense-ukraine/

The post PI Newsletter – October 2024 appeared first on Polonia Institute.

Introduction

1. General Congregation 33 made a brief mention of the “unjust treatment and exploitation of women.”1 It was part of a list of injustices in the context of new needs and situations that Jesuits were called to address in the implementation of our mission. We wish to consider this question more specifically and substantially on this occasion. This is principally because, assisted by the general rise in consciousness concerning this issue, we are more aware than previously that it is indeed a central concern of any contemporary mission that seeks to integrate faith and justice. It has a universal dimension in that it involves men and women everywhere. To an increasing extent, it cuts across barriers of class and culture. It is of personal concern to those who work with us in our mission, especially lay and religious women.

The Situation

2. The dominance of men in their relationship with women has found expression in many ways. It has included discrimination against women in educational opportunities, the disproportionate burden they are called upon to bear in family life, paying them a lesser wage for the same work, limiting their access to positions of influence when admitted to public life, and, sadly but only too frequently, outright violence against women themselves. In some parts of the world, this violence still includes female circumcision, dowry deaths, and the murder of unwanted infant girls. Women are commonly treated as objects in advertising and in the media. In extreme cases, for example in promoting international sex tourism, they are regarded as commodities to be trafficked.
3. This situation, however, has begun to change, chiefly because of the critical awakening and courageous protest of women themselves. But many men, too, have joined women in rejecting attitudes that offend against the dignity of men and women alike. Nonetheless, we still have with us the legacy of systematic discrimination against women. It is embedded within the economic, social, political, religious, and even linguistic structures of our societies. It is often part of an even deeper cultural prejudice and stereotype. Many women, indeed, feel that men have been slow to recognize the full humanity of women. They often experience a defensive reaction from men when they draw attention to this blindness.
4. The prejudice against women, to be sure, assumes different forms in different cultures. Sensitivity is needed to avoid using any one, simple, measurement of what counts as discrimination. But it is nonetheless a universal reality. Further, in many parts of the world, women already cruelly disadvantaged because of war, poverty, migration, or race, often suffer a double disadvantage precisely because they are women. There is a “feminization of poverty” and a distinctive “feminine face of oppression.”

The Church addresses the situation

5. Church social teaching, especially within the last ten years, has reacted strongly against this continuing discrimination and prejudice. Pope John Paul II, in particular, has called upon all men and women of goodwill, especially Catholics, to make the essential equality of women a lived reality. This is a genuine “sign of the times.”2 We need to join with inter-church and interreligious groups in order to advance this social transformation.
6. Church teaching certainly promotes the role of women within the family, but it also stresses the need for their contribution in the Church and in public life. It draws upon the text of Genesis, which speaks of men and women created in the image of God (Gn 1:27) and the prophetic praxis of Jesus in his relationship with women. These sources call us to change our attitudes and work for a change of structures. The original plan of God was for a loving relationship of respect, mutuality, and equality between men and women, and we are called to fulfill this plan. The tone of this ecclesial reflection on Scripture makes it clear that there is an urgency in the challenge to translate theory into practice not only outside, but also within, the Church itself.

The role and responsibility of Jesuits

7. The Society of Jesus accepts this challenge and our responsibility for doing what we can as men and as a male religious order. We do not pretend or claim to speak for women. However, we do speak out of what we have learned from women about ourselves and our relationship with them.
8. In making this response we are being faithful, in the changed consciousness of our times, to our mission: the service of faith, of which the promotion of justice is an absolute requirement. We respond, too, out of the acknowledgment of our own limited but significant influence as Jesuits and as male religious within the Church. We are conscious of the damage to the People of God brought about in some cultures by the alienation of women who no longer feel at home in the Church, and who are not able with integrity to transmit Catholic values to their families, friends, and colleagues.

Conversion

9. In response, we Jesuits first ask God for the grace of conversion. We have been part of a civil and ecclesial tradition that has offended against women. And, like many men, we tend to convince ourselves that there is no problem. However unwittingly, we have often contributed to a form of clericalism that has reinforced male domination with an ostensibly divine sanction. By making this declaration we wish to react personally and collectively and do what we can to change this regrettable situation.

Appreciation

10. We know that the nurturing of our own faith and much of our own ministry would be greatly diminished without the dedication, generosity, and joy that women bring to the schools, parishes, and other fields in which we labor together. This is particularly true of the work of lay and religious women among the urban and rural poor, often in extremely difficult and challenging situations. In addition, many religious congregations of women have adopted the Spiritual Exercises and our Jesuit Constitutions as the basis for their own spirituality and governance, becoming an extended Ignatian family. Religious and lay women have in recent years become experts in giving Spiritual Exercises. As retreat directors, especially of the Exercises in daily life, they have enriched the Ignatian tradition and our own understanding of ourselves and of our ministry. Many women have helped to reshape our theological tradition in a way that has liberated both men and women. We wish to express our appreciation for this generous contribution of women and hope that this mutuality in ministry might continue and flourish.

Ways forward

11. We wish to specify more concretely at least some ways in which Jesuits may better respond to this challenge to our lives and mission. We do not presume that there is any one model of male-female relationship to be recommended, much less imposed, throughout the world or even within a given culture. Rather we note the need for a real delicacy in our response. We must be careful not to interfere in a way that alienates the culture; rather we must endeavor to facilitate a more organic process of change. We should be particularly sensitive to adopting a pedagogy that does not drive a further wedge between men and women who in certain circumstances are already under great pressure from other divisive cultural or socio-economic forces.
12. In the first place, we invite all Jesuits to listen carefully and courageously to the experience of women. Many women feel that men simply do not listen to them. There is no substitute for such listening. More than anything else it will bring about change. Without listening, action in this area, no matter how well-intentioned, is likely to bypass the real concerns of women and to confirm male condescension and reinforce male dominance. Listening, in a spirit of partnership and equality, is the most practical response we can make, and is the foundation for our mutual partnership to reform unjust structures.
13. Secondly, we invite all Jesuits, as individuals and through their institutions, to align themselves in solidarity with women. The practical ways of doing this will vary from place to place and from culture to culture, but many examples come readily to mind:

13.1 —explicit teaching of the essential equality of women and men in Jesuit ministries, especially in schools, colleges and universities;

13.2 — support for liberation movements that oppose the exploitation of women and encourage their entry into political and social life;

13.3 — specific attention to the phenomenon of violence against women;

13.4 — appropriate presence of women in Jesuit ministries and institutions, not excluding the ministry of formation;

13.5 — genuine involvement of women in consultation and decision-making in our Jesuit ministries;

13.6 — respectful cooperation with our female colleagues in shared projects;

13.7 — use of appropriately inclusive language in speech and official documents;

13.8 — promotion of the education of women and, in particular, the elimination of all forms of illegitimate discrimination between boys and girls in the educational process. Many of these, we are happy to say, are already being practiced in different parts of the world. We confirm their value and recommend a more universal implementation as appropriate.

14. It would be idle to pretend that all the answers to the issues surrounding a new, more just relationship between women and men have been found, or are satisfactory to all. In particular, it may be anticipated that some other questions about the role of women in civil and ecclesial society will undoubtedly mature over time. Through committed and persevering research, through exposure to different cultures, and through reflection on experience, Jesuits hope to participate in clarifying these questions and advancing the underlying issues of justice. The change of sensibilities which this involves will inevitably have implications for Church teaching and practice. In this context, we ask Jesuits to live, as always, with the tension involved in being faithful to the teachings of the Church and at the same time trying to read accurately the signs of the times.

Conclusion

15. The Society gives thanks for all that has already been achieved through the often costly struggle for a more just relationship between women and men. We thank women for the lead they have given and continue to give. In particular, we thank women religious, with whom we feel a special bond, and who have been pioneers in so many ways in their unique contribution to the mission of faith and justice. We are grateful, too, for what the Society and individual Jesuits have contributed to this new relationship, which is a source of great enrichment for both men and women.
16. Above all, we want to commit the Society more formally and explicitly to regard this solidarity with women as integral to our mission. In this way, we hope that the whole Society will regard this work for reconciliation between women and men in all its forms as integral to its interpretation of Decree 4 of GC 32 for our times. We know that a reflective and sustained commitment to bring about this respectful reconciliation can flow only from our God of love and justice who reconciles all and promises a world in which “there is neither Jew nor Greek, there is neither slave nor free, for you are all one in Christ Jesus.” (Gal 3:28)

The post JESUITS AND THE SITUATION OF WOMEN IN CHURCH AND CIVIL SOCIETY appeared first on Polonia Institute.

https://www.polskieradio.pl/395/9766/Artykul/3411136

Troops, weaponry on parade as Poland marks Armed Forces Day

https://www.polskieradio.pl/395/7784/Artykul/3414312

Poland signs offset deals for Apache helicopters

https://www.polskieradio.pl/395/9766/Artykul/3411053

Polish Tech: Grand Ambitions on a Shaky Foundation

US and Asian investments are pouring into Poland. However, the country must overcome large hurdles to become a tech leader.

https://cepa.org/article/polish-tech-grand-ambitions-on-a-shaky-foundation/

PM says Poland will bid to host summer Olympics in 2040 or 2044

https://www.polskieradio.pl/395/7790/Artykul/3414631

Legendary Marriott leaves Warsaw’s center after 35 years

https://www.polskieradio.pl/395/7786/Artykul/3412226

Poland without hands to work; Entrepreneurs fear that they will soon run out of workers.

https://www.warsawvoice.pl/WVpage/pages/article.php/60612/news

The post PI Newsletter – August 2024 appeared first on Polonia Institute.

“It is like a well-made horror film”

Watching the communist party nomenklatura sing the “Internationale” was a specific experience of the communist era. Participants in successive plenums, congresses and other meetings broadcast in the media began and ended in the same way: standing and at attention, though not in a completely unanimous chorus, intoning this song, written during the Paris Commune.

Fat men with fat faces, with the herringbone-lean Jaruzelski standing out, roared menacingly: ‘Arise, wretches of hunger’, providing an unforgettable aesthetic experience for observers. ‘Arise, wretched of the earth,’ wailed the pompous types from Moscow’s imposition in charge of Poland.

In Western Europe, I discovered that quite a large group of people still sang the “Internationale” of their own free will. In communist countries, there were none of these unless they did it for risky kicks like I did, thundering in custody ‘to let the chain fall from the free spirit, and to destroy and burn the house of bondage’. Instead of being recognised for exceptionally knowing more than the chorus of the workers’ anthem, I received the opposite reaction from the hacks.

In France, we were invited to a chateau near Paris by trade unionists from the CFDT, a socialist syndicate that worked with “Solidarity”. It was a leisurely weekend, and the main event was a sort of marriage arranged by one of the union leaders to a woman nearly 30 years his junior. When we rolled into the dining hall on Sunday, somewhat worn out, we found that the new tenants of the castle were also functioning, primarily families with children who also wanted to take advantage of the beautiful site and its picturesque surroundings. The frowning trade unionists, on seeing them, pulled themselves together and began, as much as they could muster, to roar the “Internationale”. It was aimed at the bourgeoisie with whom they found themselves unexpectedly under the same roof.

There are two “Internationals”

Not only did we not join in, but we expressed our reluctant astonishment. The newcomers, whom the trade unionists tried to provoke and who indeed stared at them unsympathetically – which is easy to understand – were presumably just as wealthy, as evidenced by their choice of the same weekend holiday destination. Our behaviour provoked indignation from the CFDT brothers. A friend of ours from the union averted a looming crisis by explaining that the “Internationale” had a bad connotation for us and that, as uninformed people (Poles, after all), we could not understand its objectively progressive character.

With the collapse of communism, the “International’s” singing also declined, compromising the orthodox version of Marxism, which was based on a vision of the messianic role of the working class gaining power through an apocalyptic revolution. In time, a new variant of this emerged, namely John Lennon’s ‘Imagine.’ Comparing the two versions allows us to understand the evolution of today’s revolutionary imagery.

The old version is pathetic – the new is lyrical. In the old one, the lump of the world is moved from its foundations; it leads to battle and toil; there is much blood, fire and sweat; tyrants tremble, and vultures’ claws are filed down. Version two is persuasive. Just imagine – it suggests. Imagine that there is nothing that formed human civilisation. There is no religion, and therefore no paradise or hell, no property or countries, i.e. nations, nothing to fight for or sacrifice; we live only in the present moment, and there is only the sky above us as a natural phenomenon because that is the only way Lennon can be understood. And all this is sung in a sweet voice that sends us back to the vocal and intellectual displays of ten-year-olds in school catechism class.

Agnieszka Kołakowska has written that she prefers not to imagine such a world. I understand her. ‘Imagine’ is like a well-made horror film in which we see a demonic grimace beneath a child’s delightfully smiling face. Lennon offers us a dehumanised void. He delightfully convinces us that destroying the human world is more possible than we think. That neither he nor the throngs of his followers, belting out this anthem in response to aggression and terrorism, understand any of this is even more frightening. We will enter the new utopia easily, quickly and unknowingly. When we start to die, it will be too late.

The old “Internationale” thrilled with apocalyptic-Genean passion and exalted us with blood and destruction. ‘Imagine’ seduces us with a seamless dream. Whatever the consequences, the classic “Internationale” expresses brutal vitality. ‘Imagine’ is a symptom of its disappearance.

Translation JC

For the original in Polish, please see:

https://wpolityce.pl/polityka/700597-imagine-lennona-jest-jak-dobrze-zrobiony-horror

The post There are two “Internationals” appeared first on Polonia Institute.